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TAKING BACK WHAT’S THEIRS:  THE RECESS 
APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE, PRO FORMA 
SESSIONS, AND A POLITICAL TUG-OF-WAR 
Alexander M. Wolf* 
 
This Note surveys the current landscape of the Recess Appointments 
Clause.  With the recent recess appointments of Richard Cordray to direct 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and three other 
individuals to join the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), came an 
influx of old—and new—controversy over the President's recess 
appointment authority.  This Note explores interpretational issues that have 
surrounded the Clause since its inception, as well as novel issues that have 
arisen with the Congress’s use of pro forma sessions in an attempt to block 
recess appointments and derail the executive’s agenda.  The conflict over 
control of the appointments process is at its peak, as exemplified by the 
current litigation seeking to invalidate President Obama's most recent 
recess appointments.  This Note examines the varied interpretations of the 
Clause, the current litigation and potential dispositions, the increasing 
congressional trend of using the appointments process as an obstructionist 
device, and the possible state of both the CFPB and the Recess 
Appointments Clause after litigation.  Ultimately, this piece proposes a 
modified functionalist standard by which the validity of recess appointments 
should be judged.  That is, if the Senate is in a truly functional recess for a 
period of longer than three days, then the President should be able to make 
a valid recess appointment.  Additionally, this three-day rule can be broken 
in the event of an emergency that renders the Senate unable to advise and 
consent to a nominee at a time when a recess appointment is necessary for 
the uninterrupted functioning of the government. 
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INTRODUCTION 
President Obama must have been happy.  After taking the keys to the 
White House, he was handed a country on the brink—a scathed country 
trying to survive what many consider to be the worst financial crisis since 
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the Great Depression.1  But on July 21, 2010, President Obama matched the 
magnitude of the crisis with an equally epic financial services industry 
reform2—the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act3 (Dodd-Frank)—the most sweeping reform of its kind since the Great 
Depression.4  By affecting almost every aspect of the financial services 
industry through increased regulation, the President, and many in Congress, 
hope to prevent a similar crisis and restore public faith in the financial 
system.5 
As part of this vast and polarizing institutional reform,6 Dodd-Frank 
established a new watchdog, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB).7  The CFPB, a centerpiece of the Dodd-Frank Act,8 is an 
administrative agency focused directly on consumers and aimed at 
protecting them from “unfair, deceptive and abusive financial practices.”9  
According to the organic statute, however, a CFPB Director must be 
appointed before the CFPB can exercise the full authority granted to it 
under Dodd-Frank.10  Thus, opponents of the controversial Bureau, who 
asserted—and continue to assert—that the Bureau has unfettered authority 
with limited oversight,11 planned to starve the CFPB of its full authority by 
preventing the appointment of a director.12  
The responsibility to install a director fell jointly to the President and the 
Senate, as mandated by Dodd-Frank and the Appointments Clause of the 
 
 1. See, e.g., Jon Hilsenrath et al., Worst Crisis Since ’30s, With No End Yet in Sight, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, at A1; Chris Isidore, The Great Recession, CNN MONEY 
(Mar. 25, 2009, 5:19 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/25/news/economy/depression_
comparisons/. 
 2. Remarks on Signing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 3 (July 21, 2010). 
 3. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 4. See Damian Paletta & Aaron Lucchetti, Law Remakes U.S. Financial Landscape, 
WALL ST. J., July 16, 2010, at A1. 
 5. See William Sweet, Dodd-Frank Act Becomes Law, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jul. 21, 2010, 11:49 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2010/07/21/dodd-frank-act-becomes-law/. 
 6. See, e.g., Binyamin Applebaum & Brady Dennis, Dodd Bill Would Redo Entire 
Regulatory System, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2009, at A18. 
 7. See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, Warning Shot on Financial Protection, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
9, 2011, at C1. 
 8. See id. 
 9. Creating the Consumer Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/creatingthebureau/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
 10. Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (C.F.P.B.), N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.
nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/c/consumer_financial_protection_bure
au/index.html (last updated Jan. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Times Topics].   
 11. See, e.g., Press Release, Sen. Richard Shelby, 44 U.S. Sens. to Obama:  No 
Accountability, No Confirmation (May 5, 2011), available at http://shelby.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm/newsreleases?ContentRecord_id=893bc8b0-2e73-4555-8441-
d51e0ccd1d17 [hereinafter Shelby Press Release]. 
 12. See id.; Laurence H. Tribe, Op-Ed., Games and Gimmicks in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 6, 2012, at A25. 
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U.S. Constitution.13  Strong opposition from the financial services industry 
and congressional Republicans ensured that the appointment of the 
Democratic President’s nominee would be a near-impossible feat.14  On 
May 5, 2011, nearly all Republican senators sent President Obama a letter, 
assuring him, in no uncertain terms, that they would not “confirm any 
nominee . . . to be the Director of the new [CFPB] absent structural changes 
[to the Bureau].”15  Eventually, after countless congressional hearings, 
Senate filibusters, and an all-out assault by an army of conservative 
lobbyists,16 the CFPB received its long-awaited leader, President Obama’s 
nominee, former Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray.17  In fact, many 
Republicans view Cordray as the type of person who would “normally 
cruise to Senate confirmation.”18  The opposition to Cordray’s appointment 
demonstrates the distinction between objecting to a nominee based on that 
individual’s qualifications and character, and objecting to a nominee in an 
effort to derail the executive’s effective execution of the law and his or her 
administrative agenda.19 
Like the CFPB itself, President Obama’s method of appointing Cordray 
proved highly controversial.20  Faced with an uncooperative Senate, 
President Obama circumvented the Senate confirmation process, which 
requires the chamber’s “Advice and Consent,”21 by announcing on January 
4, 2012, that he would use his recess appointment authority to install 
Cordray as CFPB Director and three individuals as members of the 
NLRB.22  Today, the battle for control over the appointments process is 
arguably the most contested power struggle between the legislative and 
 
 13. The President is granted authority to appoint individuals to certain government 
positions by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see 
infra Part I.B.1. 
 14. See Jim Puzzanghera, GOP Stalls Confirmation of Consumer Agency Nominee, L.A. 
TIMES (Sept. 7, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2011/sep/07/business/la-fi-consumer-
bureau-cordray-20110907. 
 15. Shelby Press Release, supra note 11. 
 16. See, e.g., Puzzanghera, supra note 14. 
 17. Remarks at Shaker Heights High School in Shaker Heights, Ohio, 2012 DAILY 
COMP. PRES. DOCS. 2 (Jan. 4, 2012); See Press Release, White House, President Obama 
Announces Recess Appointments to Key Administration Posts (Jan. 4, 2012), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/04/President-obama-announces-recess-
appointments-key-administration-posts [hereinafter Recess Appointments Press Release].  
Along with Cordray, Obama nominated three members to the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) whose nominations face similar scrutiny. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.b. 
 18. Joseph Williams, GOP to Richard Cordray:  Nothing Personal, POLITICO (July 20, 
2011, 11:42 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0711/59524.html. 
 19. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers 
Without a Senate Confirmation Vote?, 122 YALE L.J. 940, 942–44 (2013). 
 20. Ronald D. Orol, Obama Recess Appoints Cordray to CFPB, WALL ST. J. MARKET 
WATCH (Jan. 4, 2012), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2012-01-04/economy/30688232_1_
obama-recess-recess-appointments-obama-appointments. 
 21. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 22. See Recess Appointments Press Release, supra note 17. 
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executive branches.23  The struggle between the two branches reached a 
new height in 2007, when Democratic members of Congress, fearful of 
certain recess appointments, attempted to stifle President Bush’s authority 
to make such appointments by periodically holding brief pro forma 
sessions, rather than going into a full-fledged recess.24  The effectiveness 
and merits of this practice are discussed below. 
This Note is organized in four parts and will address various questions 
raised by the Cordray appointment, including the novel issue of whether pro 
forma sessions of the Senate can disrupt a recess sufficiently to preclude the 
President from making recess appointments and Congress’s trend away 
from using the appointments process to evaluate the nominees themselves 
and instead use the power as an obstructionist device.  Part I introduces the 
constitutional provisions most pertinent to this discussion, the history of pro 
forma sessions, and commonly debated interpretational issues regarding the 
Recess Appointments Clause (RAC).  Next, to frame the discussion of the 
current conflict, Part II provides contemporary background on RAC usage 
and pro forma sessions, relying heavily on the Department of Justice’s 
(DOJ) Office of Legal Counsel’s (OLC) January 2012 opinion25 (2012 
OLC Opinion) on the validity of the January 4, 2012 appointments. Then, 
Part III explores the conflict over the validity of these appointments, 
gleaning arguments from current litigation—including the D.C. Circuit’s 
2013 decision regarding the NLRB appointments—and a detailed report 
from the Congressional Research Service (CRS).26  Lastly, Part IV supports 
a functionalist RAC interpretation, suggesting a standard that allows the 
President to make recess appointments when the Senate is unable to advise 
and consent to a nominee for a period longer than three days, with an 
emergency exception. 
I.  THE CFPB AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
RECESS APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE 
This part begins with a brief background on the CFPB and why the 
Bureau is particularly susceptible to harm as a result of appointment 
gridlock.  Next, this part surveys relevant constitutional clauses and their 
relation to the history and current use of pro forma sessions.  It also 
explores why almost all RAC controversies have their genesis in formalist 
and functionalist interpretations of the Clause. 
 
 23. Developments in the Law—Presidential Authority, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2057, 2146–
47 (2012) [hereinafter Presidential Authority]. 
 24. Id. at 2152. 
 25. Lawfulness of Recess Appointments During a Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding 
Periodic Pro Forma Sessions, 36 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 OLC Opinion], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/memoranda-opinions.html. 
 26. See infra note 34. 
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A.  The Birth of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
Before exploring the intersection between the RAC and the CFPB, it is 
important to understand why presidential appointments and the RAC are 
implicated in the creation of the Bureau.  The CFPB is an executive 
agency27 whose director “shall be appointed by the President, by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate.”28  As such, there is little doubt that 
whomever holds the position of CFPB Director is a principal officer of the 
United States within the meaning of the Constitution29 and, thus, properly 
subject to the Appointments Clause30 and its supplement,31 the RAC.32 
The CFPB consolidates a wide range of regulatory responsibility, which, 
prior to the passage of Dodd-Frank, was scattered across government 
entities including the Federal Reserve, the Federal Trade Commission, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development.33  The Bureau was also granted new authority to 
regulate nonbank financial companies,34 an industry largely unregulated 
prior to the passage of Dodd-Frank.35  Unlike other regulators, the CFPB is 
focused solely on consumer protection,36 aimed at shielding consumers 
from “unfair, deceptive, and abusive financial practices.”37  Today, most 
consumer financial protection at the federal level is the CFPB’s 
responsibility.38 
Yet, this broad jurisdiction did not come automatically with the 
enactment of Dodd-Frank.39  The CFPB’s newfound authority40 came with 
statutory strings attached—these new powers could not be exercised until 
the agency had a director.41  This constraint is of no small import, as 
CFPB’s new authority over entities like nonbank mortgage brokers became 
the “agency’s most immediate focus.”42  President Obama remarked that, 
 
 27. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (Supp. V 2011).  “Executive agency” is defined as “an 
Executive department, a Government corporation, and an independent establishment.” 
5 U.S.C. § 105 (2006). 
 28. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(2). 
 29. See discussion infra Part I.B.1. 
 30. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; infra discussion Part I.B.1. 
 31. See infra notes 58–66 and accompanying text. 
 32. See discussion infra Part I.B.2. 
 33. See, e.g., Times Topics, supra note 10; Creating the Consumer Bureau, supra note 
9. 
 34. See, e.g., DAVID H. CARPENTER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 42323, PRESIDENT 
OBAMA’S JANUARY 4, 2012, RECESS APPOINTMENTS:  LEGAL ISSUES 28 (2012). 
 35. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, New Consumer Chief Promises Strong Agenda, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2012, at B3. 
 36. See Creating the Consumer Bureau, supra note 9. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See, e.g., Times Topics, supra note 10 (noting that pursuant to Dodd-Frank, “the 
agency could not write new rules or supervise financial companies other than banks without 
a director”). 
 40. See, e.g., CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 34, at 28. 
 41. See Wyatt, supra note 35. 
 42. See id. 
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without the ability to fill the director vacancy, the Bureau “is left without 
the tools it needs to prevent dishonest [nonbank financial products 
companies] from taking advantage of consumers.”43  President Obama 
continued, “[t]hat’s inexcusable.  It’s wrong.  And I refuse to take ‘no’ for 
an answer.”44 
In exercising its full authority, the CFPB can write rules, issue orders, 
and subpoena entities within its jurisdiction for both testimony and 
documents, which can form the basis for enforcement actions.45  
Importantly, the CFPB has authority to write and enforce standards for 
various consumer financial products that have not yet been subject to 
extensive regulation, such as mortgages and credit cards.46  It is this 
authority, coupled with the CFPB’s direct funding from the Federal 
Reserve—circumventing the congressional appropriations process47—that 
provides the basis for critics’ claims that the CFPB has inappropriate 
sweeping authority, with no accountability.48 
B.  Laying the Constitutional Foundation 
There are several clauses and concepts in the Constitution that are 
fundamental to this Note’s discussion of the current landscape of the RAC.  
They are briefly addressed below. 
1.  The Appointments Clause 
The Appointments Clause of the Constitution prescribes that the 
President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, 
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States 
. . . .”49  The two-branch process was enacted as a “check upon a spirit of 
favoritism in the president, and would tend greatly to preventing the 
appointment of unfit characters.”50  An individual appointed by this process 
is known as a “principal officer,”51 and generally “exercise[es] significant 
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.”52  This executive 
nomination, senatorial advice and consent, and subsequent appointment 
process is followed for both executive branch and judicial branch 
 
 43. Orol, supra note 20. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Times Topics, supra note 10. 
 46. See id.; see also CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 34, at 28. 
 47. See Presidential Authority, supra note 23, at 2152. 
 48. See, e.g., Shelby Press Release, supra note 11. 
 49. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 50. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 405 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005). 
Hamilton also noted the harm that misguided nominations might do to a President’s 
“political existence.” Id. 
 51. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (per curiam). 
 52. Id. at 126. 
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appointees.53  Historically, the Senate has granted a greater degree of 
deference to the President’s nomination of executive branch officials, 
compared to the President’s judicial nominations.54 
The Appointments Clause separates federal officers into two categories:  
principal officers who must be nominated by the President, then confirmed 
upon the advice and consent of the Senate, and “inferior officers” whose 
appointments can be expedited without the two-branch process.55  
Generally,56 a major distinguishing factor between principal and inferior 
officers is “the extent to which the officers are ‘directed and supervised’ by 
persons ‘appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent 
of the Senate.’”57 
2.  The Recess Appointments Clause 
Article II, Section 2, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution, or the RAC, was 
enacted as a supplement to the Appointments Clause.58  The RAC states, 
“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen 
during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall 
expire at the End of their next Session.”59  Recesses can generally be 
classified into two categories:  intersession recesses—or, recesses that occur 
between two sessions of Congress60—and intrasession recesses—or 
recesses that occur within one particular session of Congress.61  It is widely 
recognized that the RAC was enacted in order to ensure the continuity of 
the government by allowing the President to fill vital vacancies at times 
when the Senate would be unable to advise and consent to a nominee.62  
The Framers—recognizing that the Senate could not be obliged to stay in 
session 365 days a year,63 and at a time in which it was more difficult for 
 
 53. JOHN B. ATTANASIO & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
242 (4th ed. 2012). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. at 242–44. 
 56. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988) (“The line between ‘inferior’ and 
‘principal’ officers is . . . far from clear.”). See generally ATTANASIO & GOLDSTEIN, supra 
note 53. 
 57. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (quoting Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997)). 
 58. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, supra note 50, at 361 (Alexander Hamilton); see also 
T.J. HALSTEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33009, RECESS APPOINTMENTS:  A LEGAL 
OVERVIEW 1 (2005). 
 59. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 3. 
 60. These recesses are also known as sine die adjournments. They are the final 
adjournment of a one—or two—year congressional session. Glossary:  Adjournment Sine 
Die, U.S. SENATE http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/adjournment_sine_die
.htm.  That is, a sine die recess is an intersession recess, as opposed to all other recesses, 
which are intrasession recesses. See, e.g., HENRY B. HOGUE & MAUREEN BEARDEN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R 42329, RECESS APPOINTMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA 4 
(2012). 
 61. See, e.g., HOGUE & BEARDEN, supra note 60, at 4. 
 62. See, e.g., id. at 1. 
 63. See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31112, RECESS APPOINTMENTS 
OF FEDERAL JUDGES 1 (2001). 
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senators from across the country to convene in a timely fashion64—saw the 
RAC as a logical and necessary corollary to the Appointments Clause in 
order to keep the government operating effectively.65  The RAC was 
adopted into the Constitution without a single dissenting vote, and without 
debate regarding its intent and scope.66 
An individual who takes office as the result of a recess appointment has 
no less authority or standing than an individual confirmed by the Senate.67  
The Eleventh Circuit recently held that “[t]he Constitution, on its face, 
neither distinguishes nor limits the powers that a recess appointee may 
exercise while in office. . . .  [T]he appointee is afforded the full extent of 
authority commensurate with that office.”68  However, a recess appointee’s 
term is temporary, as it expires at the end of the next session of Congress.69  
Notably, there is no requirement that the recess appointee have been 
previously nominated to the position70 nor is there any explicit limitation 
regarding which offices may be filled via recess appointments.71   
Some view certain uses of the RAC as an improper commandeering of 
the Congress’s authority;72 accordingly, the Senate has attempted to 
discourage its use through prohibitive legislation.73  Based on concern over 
the increasing frequency with which recess appointments were being made, 
the Senate, in 1863, attempted to “put an end to the habit of making such 
appointments”74 by passing legislation prohibiting payment of salaries to 
certain recess appointees until they were confirmed by the Senate.75  This 
prohibition was amended in 1940 to provide some exceptions to the strict 
policy set forth nearly eighty years prior,76 and payment to recess 
 
 64. See Presidential Authority, supra note 23, at 2154. 
 65. See id.; see also HALSTEAD, supra note 58, at 2; THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, supra note 
50, at 361 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that the RAC operates as a supplement to the 
Appointments Clause when the general appointments method is unavailable.  Alexander 
Hamilton goes on to observe that obliging the Senate to remain continuously in session 
would be “improper.”).  
 66. See VIVIAN S. CHU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33009, RECESS APPOINTMENTS:  A 
LEGAL OVERVIEW 1 (2012); FISHER, supra note 63, at 1. 
 67. Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1223–24 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 
942 (2005). 
 68. Id.  
 69. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3; infra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
 70. See HOGUE & BEARDEN, supra note 60, at 6–7. 
 71. Thomas A. Curtis, Note, Recess Appointments to Article III Courts:  The Use of 
Historical Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1758, 1764 (1984). 
 72. Manu Raju & Scott Wong, Obama Recess Appointments:  GOP Stuck on Response, 
POLITICO (Jan. 25, 2012, 11:55 P.M.), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/719
84.html. 
 73. See HALSTEAD, supra note 58, at 13–14; FISHER, supra note 63, at 5. 
 74. FISHER, supra note 63, at 5 (quoting CONG. GLOBE 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 565 (1863) 
(statement of Sen. Fessenden)). 
 75. Act of Feb. 9, 1863, ch. 25, 12 Stat. 642, 646; see HALSTEAD, supra note 58, at 13–
14; FISHER, supra note 63, at 5–6. 
 76. See FISHER, supra note 63, at 6. 
 2064 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
appointees is now permissible under certain circumstances.77  The OLC, in 
discussing the propriety of the Cordray appointment, held that Congress’s 
willingness to provide payment to recess appointees under certain 
circumstances is an express acquiescence that intrasession recess 
appointments, like the Cordray appointment, are constitutional.78 
The DOJ recently made this argument regarding the recess appointment 
of an Article III judge.79  Although some submit that the limitations on 
payment to recess appointees are indicative of Congress’s reluctance to 
allow recess appointments for vacancies during congressional sessions,80 
the fact remains that the Senate has acquiesced and agreed to compensate 
such appointees, arguably approving of recess appointments for certain 
vacancies occurring in-session.81 
As for the termination of a recess appointee’s term, the RAC states that it 
shall be at the “End of [the Senate’s] next Session.”82  It is “clearly 
established” that this phrase means “the end of the session following the 
final adjournment of the current session of Congress.”83  Thus, an 
appointment made during the first session of a particular Congress will not 
expire until the end of the second session of that Congress.84  Accordingly, 
Richard Cordray’s recess appointment expires at the end of 2013 and, on 
January 14, 2013, President Obama announced his renomination of Cordray 
for CFPB Director.85  A deeper exploration of the interpretive and practical 
controversies surrounding the RAC is discussed below.86 
 
 77. Recess appointees receive payment (1) if the vacancy arises within thirty days of the 
end of the Senate’s session; (2) if a nomination is pending before the Senate at the 
conclusion of a session, and that individual had not been appointed during a preceding 
recess; and (3) if a nomination is rejected by the Senate within thirty days of the conclusion 
of a session, and a different individual receives a recess appointment. 5 U.S.C. § 5503 
(2006); see also FISHER, supra note 63, at 6. 
 78. 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25, at 7 (citing Recess Appointments, 41 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 463, 466 (1960)). See infra Part I.D.2 for more on intrasession recesses. 
 79. “[T]he constitutionality of intra-session recess appointments has been reinforced by 
various affirmative indications of Congressional acquiescence, including Congress’s 
decision to pay such appointees in various circumstances.” Reply Brief for the Intervenor 
United States Supporting the Constitutionality of Judge Pryor’s Appointment As a Judge of 
This Court at 16–17, Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-16424), 
2004 WL 3589822 [hereinafter Evans Intervening Brief]. But see Canning v. NLRB, --- F.3d 
--- Nos. 12-1115, 12-1153, 2013 WL 276024, at *23–24 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that 
recess appointments cannot be made during intrasession recesses); see also infra Part III.A.1. 
 80. See Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments 
Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1543–46 (2005). 
 81. See id. at 1546. 
 82. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 3. 
 83. Intrasession Recess Appointments, 13 Op. O.L.C. 271, 273 (1989) (citing Recess 
Appointments, 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 463, 469–70 (1960)). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Remarks on the Nomination of Mary Jo White To Be Chair of the Security and 
Exchange Commission and the Renomination of Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
Director Richard A. Cordray, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 2 (Jan. 24, 2013). 
 86. See infra Part I.D.1–3. 
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There are many conceivable uses of the RAC that can be relatively 
uncontroversial, even when used to appoint high-ranking officials.87  
Throughout the early history of the United States, short sessions and long 
recesses of six to nine months characterized the congressional calendar.88  
This perhaps rationalized the need for the RAC during this period of time,89 
when slow communication and travel restricted Congress’s ability to 
convene.90  Congressional sessions often lasted less than half the year,91 
and the earliest sessions averaged approximately seven months long.92  As 
time went on and technology and infrastructure advanced, the congressional 
calendar shifted to more frequent, and relatively short, intrasession recesses 
as well as shorter intersession recesses.93  Today, intrasession recesses can 
last from a few days to more than a month.94  As the congressional calendar 
has undergone dramatic changes over time, some argue, so too have the 
uses and concerns over the RAC.95 
3.  The Adjournment Clause 
The Adjournment Clause helps define the contours of a recess or 
adjournment.  The Constitution instructs that “neither [chamber], during the 
Session of Congress, shall, without Consent of the other, adjourn for more 
than three days . . . .”96  Thus, in order for one chamber to adjourn for more 
than three days, both chambers must pass a concurrent resolution to that 
effect.97  The resolution will generally include the date on which the 
particular chamber will adjourn, and the date on which that chamber will 
reconvene.98  Today, these resolutions usually include a provision that 
allows the chamber to reconvene sooner than the agreed upon date.99  
Importantly, the Senate was not adjourned pursuant to the Adjournment 
 
 87. See JAY WEXLER, THE ODD CLAUSES:  UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH 
TEN OF ITS MOST CURIOUS PROVISIONS 46–47 (2011). 
 88. HALSTEAD, supra note 58, at 2 (citing HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 
21308, RECESS APPOINTMENTS:  FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2005)). 
 89. Id.; see also Michael A. Carrier, Note, When Is the Senate In Recess for Purposes of 
the Recess Appointments Clause?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2204, 2210, 2214–15 (1994). 
 90. See Presidential Authority, supra note 23, at 2154. 
 91. See HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21308, RECESS APPOINTMENTS:  
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2012). 
 92. Carrier, supra note 89, at 2226 (citing U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, 1993–94 
OFFICIAL DIRECTORY, 103D CONG. 580 (1993)). 
 93. See HALSTEAD, supra note 58, at 2 (citing Rappaport, supra note 80, at 1500–01). 
 94. Rappaport, supra note 80, at 1501. 
 95. See Alexander I. Platt, Note, Preserving the Appointments Safety Valve, 30 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 255, 271 (2012) (“The originally conferred powers of the RAC have been 
mooted by developments in communications and travel technologies and the expansion of 
the legislative calendar.”); see also HOGUE & BEARDEN, supra note 60, at 8–9; Rappaport, 
supra note 80, at 1501 (noting the shift in congressional scheduling). 
 96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4. 
 97. Glossary: Adjourn for More Than Three Days, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/
reference/glossary_term/adjourn_more_than_3_days.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
 98. See HOGUE & BEARDEN, supra note 60, at 9. 
 99. See id. at 9 n.31. 
 2066 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
Clause at the time of the Cordray and NLRB appointments.100  By refusing 
to pass a concurrent resolution, the House of Representatives can prevent 
the Senate from recessing for a period longer than three days, and vice 
versa, raising questions of whether recess appointments can be made when 
the Senate is not in an Adjournment Clause recess.101  
If one chamber of Congress desires to adjourn, and the other chamber 
does not consent, the chamber seeking adjournment can functionally 
adjourn, and hold brief pro forma sessions102 every three days in order to 
meet the Adjournment Clause’s “three day” requirement.103  With a 
Republican majority in control of the House at the time of the Cordray 
proceedings, and the specter of recess appointments haunting the halls of 
the Capitol, it is unlikely that the Democrat-controlled Senate would have 
been able to acquire the House’s consent to recess, which might have 
opened the door for an influx of recess appointments.104 
4.  The Take Care Clause 
In laying out the executive’s responsibilities, Article II, Section 3—the 
Take Care Clause—requires the President to “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.”105  The Clause is pertinent here as Dodd-Frank—a bill 
approved by a majority of both chambers of Congress and subsequently 
signed into law by the President106—mandated the creation of the CFPB.107  
However, it is a Senate faction—from the same chamber that previously 
gave Dodd-Frank final Congressional approval108—that took it upon itself 
to stifle the agency created by a law that it, as a body, enacted.109  In 
litigation related to the January 4, 2012 recess appointments, the DOJ 
invokes the Take Care Clause, contending that the aforementioned use of 
pro forma sessions to preclude key recess appointments “prevent[s] the 
execution of a duly passed Act of Congress and the performance of the 
 
 100. See infra Part II.B; see also infra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 101. See infra notes 126–30 and accompanying text. 
 102. See infra Part I.C. 
 103. See infra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 104. See Letter from Representative Jeff Landry et al., to Representative John Boehner, 
Speaker of the House, et al., (June 15, 2011) [hereinafter Landry Letter] (on file with 
author).  
 105. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 106. See supra note 2.  This process fulfills the constitutional requirement known as 
bicameralism and presentment. See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, 
LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 22–25 (2010). 
 107. See Eaglesham, supra note 7; see also supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 108. 156 CONG. REC. S5932–33 (daily ed. July 15, 2010). 
 109. Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956–58 (1983) (holding that unilateral acts taken 
by one chamber of Congress that are legislative in character are unconstitutional unless such 
acts are subject to bicameralism and presentment).  The unconstitutional acts detailed in 
Chadha are known as legislative vetoes. Id. at 959–60 (Powell, J., concurring).  For further 
discussion, see infra notes 451–56 and accompanying text. 
 2013] TAKING BACK WHAT’S THEIRS 2067 
functions of an office ‘established by Law.’”110  Thus, such a practice is 
arguably in contravention of the Clause and raises balance of powers 
concerns.111  Put simply, the Senate’s role in directing executive agencies is 
limited to enacting legislation, allotting appropriations,112 and certain 
oversight functions, while the Take Care Clause leaves the President with 
the responsibility of executing the enacted legislation.113 
C.  Pro Forma Sessions 
Generally, a pro forma session begins with a single Senator gaveling-in 
the session and concludes with the same Senator ending the session only 
several seconds or minutes later.114  Historically, pro forma sessions of 
Congress have been held to satisfy certain constitutional requirements, 
including the Adjournment Clause requirement necessitating a concurrent 
resolution before either chamber of Congress can adjourn for more than 
three days.115  Thus, in situations in which one chamber is keeping the other 
open, the chamber wishing to adjourn for an extended period can satisfy the 
Adjournment Clause by holding pro forma sessions every three days.116   
Recently, in addition to enabling a chamber to adjourn for extended 
periods without the consent of the other, pro forma sessions have been 
wielded as a sword to deprive the President of the ability to make recess 
appointments.117  Although the Senate almost always118 agrees beforehand 
that there will be no business conducted during these pro forma sessions,119 
some posit that by allowing a lone senator to conduct a brief session every 
few days, and thus never recessing pursuant to the Adjournment Clause, the 
Senate can significantly shrink the window in which a President can make 
valid recess appointments.120  Although it was not the first time that this use 
of pro forma sessions was considered,121 Senate Majority Leader Harry 
Reid was the first to utilize this strategy out of concern for potential recess 
appointments by President George W. Bush in 2007.122  The practice has 
continued throughout the Obama presidency123 and has raised separation of 
 
 110. Brief for the NLRB at 63, Canning v. NLRB, --- F.3d ---, Nos. 12-1115, 12-1153, 
2013 WL 276024 (D.C. Cir. 2013) [hereinafter NLRB Brief] (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, 
§ 2, cl. 2). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Presidential Authority, supra note 23, at 2144 n.67. 
 113. See, e.g., id. at 2153–54. 
 114. Id. note 23, at 2152. 
 115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4; see also 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25, at 18. 
 116. See e.g., Platt, supra note 95, at 278. 
 117. Presidential Authority, supra note 23, at 2152. 
 118. See 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25, at 2 n.3. 
 119. See Presidential Authority, supra note 23, at 2152; see also 2012 OLC Opinion, 
supra note 25, at 2. 
 120. See Presidential Authority, supra note 23, at 2152. 
 121. See HOGUE, supra note 91, at 8 n.28; Dave Boyer, Clinton Warned Against Recess 
Appointments:  GOP Senators May Not Adjourn, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1999, at A1. 
 122. See, e.g., 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25, at 2, 19. 
 123. Id. at 2. 
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powers questions regarding the practice’s effect on the President’s explicit 
RAC authority.124  Whether these seconds-long pro forma sessions—in 
which the Senate agrees to conduct no business—interrupt a recess 
sufficiently to preclude legitimate action under the RAC is the subject of 
great debate125 and a critical aspect of this Note. 
Senators using pro forma sessions to block recess appointments have 
expressly endorsed the use of this procedural mechanism for this innovative 
purpose.126  Prior to recessing for Thanksgiving in 2007, Majority Leader 
Reid stated, in no uncertain terms, that “the Senate will be coming in for 
pro forma sessions during the Thanksgiving holiday to prevent recess 
appointments.”127  Similarly, in May 2011, out of concern for potential 
recess appointments including that of Elizabeth Warren to direct the CFPB, 
twenty senators sent a letter to Speaker of the House John Boehner 
requesting that he not pass a concurrent resolution that would allow the 
Senate to adjourn for more than three days, and instead force the Senate to 
convene in pro forma session.128  A similar request, this time supported by 
eighty members of the House, was made to House leadership the following 
month.129  Thus, pro forma sessions can be initiated either by the majority 
party in the Senate, as they were by Democrats in 2007, or forced by the 
House of Representatives, as they have been by Republicans during the 
Obama presidency.130 
The initial implementation of this strategy in 2007131 arguably proved 
effective.  President Bush made no recess appointments for the remainder of 
his term after November 2007.132  Senator Reid reasoned, “pro forma 
sessions break a long recess into shorter adjournments . . . too short to be 
considered a ‘recess’ within the meaning of the [RAC], thus preventing the 
President from exercising his constitutional power to make recess 
appointments.”133 
 
 124. See, e.g., CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 34, at 23. 
 125. See generally 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25; Charles J. Cooper et al., Are the 
Recent Recess Appointments Constitutional?, in 13 ENGAGE:  J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. 
GROUPS 76 (2012); Presidential Authority, supra note 23, at 2152.  
 126. See 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25, at 2. 
 127. 153 CONG. REC. 31,874 (2007) (statement of Sen. Reid). 
 128. Press Release, Senator David Vitter, Vitter, DeMint Urge House To Block 
Controversial Recess Appointments (May 25, 2011), available at http://www.vitter.senate
.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressRoom.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=290b81a
7-802a-23ad-4359-6d2436e2eb77. 
 129. A large coalition of freshman members requested that House leadership “take all 
appropriate measures . . . to prevent any and all recess appointments by preventing the 
Senate from officially recessing” pursuant to the Adjournment Clause. Landry Letter, supra 
note 104.  The letter continued to assure leadership that the eighty undersigned “stand ready 
to assist you in ensuring there are always sufficient members to cover the necessary pro 
forma sessions.” Id.; see also HOGUE, supra note 91, at 9. 
 130. 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25, at 2. 
 131. HOGUE, supra note 91, at 8. 
 132. Id. 
 133. 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25, at 2 (citing 154 CONG. REC. S7558 (daily ed. July 
28, 2008)). 
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D.  Differing Interpretations of the RAC 
Much of the controversy over the constitutionality of recess appointments 
hinges on the interpretation of the RAC, driven by the two main schools of 
constitutional interpretation:  formalism and functionalism.134  Formalists 
tend to favor sharp, generally unyielding, distinctions between the three 
branches and their respective responsibilities.135  Formalist interpretations 
pay heed to a historical understanding of the framers’ intentions at the time 
of the drafting and maintain that this historical meaning ought to prevail 
today.136  Sometimes, such an interpretation can come at the expense of a 
relatively cumbersome federal government not completely adapted to deal 
swiftly with contemporary issues.137  For a formalist, efficiency was never 
the goal of federalist government; Justice Brandeis observed, “[T]he 
separation of powers was adopted . . . not to promote efficiency but to 
preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.”138 
By contrast, functionalists have a more dynamic view of the Constitution, 
reading its provisions as a framework or generality.139  To this end, 
functionalists use a largely purposivist approach to constitutional 
interpretation, favoring the adaptability and workability of modern 
government over strict definitions of power.140  Such a view has permeated 
jurisprudence.  For instance, in Buckley v. Valeo141 the Supreme Court held 
that “a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one 
another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing 
itself effectively.”142  Further, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer,143 Justice Jackson described a practical approach to constitutional 
adherence:  “The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not 
and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its 
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from 
context.”144 
Over time, although the interpretation of the RAC by the executive 
branch has changed, it has nevertheless remained relatively consistent and 
 
 134. See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 106, at 376. 
 135. Id. at 377. 
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. 
 138. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (Justice 
Brandeis continued, “The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable 
friction . . . to save the people from autocracy.”); see also MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra 
note 106, at 377. 
 139. MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 106, at 377–78 (citing Martin S. Flaherty, The 
Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1813 (1996)). 
 140. Id. 
 141. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 142. Id. at 121. 
 143. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 144. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 
106, at 378 (using Justice Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence as an example of the 
functionalist approach to constitutional interpretation). 
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well settled for nearly two centuries.145  While the courts or Congress have 
not addressed the RAC’s ambiguities extensively,146 RAC interpretation 
has received significant formal attention from the executive branch through 
numerous Attorneys General and OLC Opinions.147  At the outset, it is 
important to note that the judiciary has stated, “[Attorney General Opinions 
are] rendered upon the call of the executive department, and under the 
obligation of the oath of office, and are entitled to the highest 
consideration.”148  Below, two common areas of debate—revolving around 
the terms “Vacancies that may happen” and “Recess of the Senate,” as used 
in the RAC149—are discussed.  As will be illustrated, a functionalist 
interpretation of both is the modern and well-established trend, culminating 
in an apposite 2004 Eleventh Circuit decision,150 Evans v. Stephens.151 
1.  What Are “Vacancies that may happen during the Recess”? 
The language, “The President shall have the Power to fill up all 
Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate,” has been 
interpreted in, largely, two different ways.152  Some consider the word, 
“happen,” to be synonymous with “arise” or “occur,” while others read 
“happen” as synonymous with “exist” or “to be going on.153  If “happen” is 
synonymous with “exist,” and the President can fill up all vacancies that 
exist during the recess, then it would likely imply that the vacancy at issue 
does not have to actually occur during the recess in question.154  If 
“happen” is interpreted to mean “occur” or “arise,” and the President can 
fill up vacancies that arise during the recess, then the vacancy likely must 
occur during the same recess in which it is filled using authority under the 
RAC.155  The latter, formalist, interpretation—“occur” or “arise”—is 
favored today by those seeking to limit presidential authority under the 
RAC.156  Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist 67, seems to suggest the 
“arise” interpretation,157 while a long line of Attorneys General have agreed 
 
 145. See infra Part I.D.1–2. 
 146. See, e.g., CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 34, at summary.  
 147. See, e.g., id. at 4; CHU, supra note 66, at 3. 
 148. In re Farrow, 3 F. 112, 115 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1880); see also United States v. Allocco, 
305 F.2d 704, 714 (2d Cir. 1962) (“The opinions of the Attorneys-General have been 
accepted as conclusive authority . . . .”). 
 149. CHU, supra note 66, at 3. 
 150. See infra notes 279–81 and accompanying text. 
 151. 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 942 (2005).  Notably, the 
D.C. Circuit, in a January 25, 2013 opinion disagreed with the Evans interpretation of the 
RAC. See discussion infra notes 410–27. 
 152. See HALSTEAD, supra note 58, at 3–6; WEXLER, supra note 87, at 48–52. 
 153. See WEXLER, supra note 87, at 48–49. 
 154. See HOGUE, supra note 91, at 4. 
 155. See id. at 4; Rappaport, supra note 80, at 1502–06. 
 156. Rappaport, supra note 80, at 1490–91. 
 157. THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, supra note 50, at 361 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[I]t would 
have been improper to oblige this body to be continually in session for the appointment of 
officers; and as vacancies might happen in their recess . . . .” ); see also FISHER, supra note 
63, at 2. 
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that the functionalist interpretation—“exist”—satisfies the reason, scope, 
and purpose of the Constitution.158 
Support for the proposition that the President has authority to make a 
recess appointment regardless of when the vacancy occurs—or the “exist” 
interpretation—first began in 1823,159 when Attorney General William Wirt 
found it “perfectly immaterial when the vacancy first arose; for, whether it 
arose during the session of the Senate, or during their recess, it equally 
requires to be filled.”160  Wirt’s position has remained the prevalent RAC 
interpretation to this day,161 supported by a long line of subsequent 
Attorney General Opinions162 and first approved by the federal judiciary in 
an 1880 district court decision.163  Subsequent judicial opinions have 
confirmed this position,164 with the Second Circuit holding that not 
allowing the President to make a recess appointment for a vacancy that 
occurred while the Senate was in session would “create Executive paralysis 
and do violence to the orderly functioning of our complex government.”165 
Despite these holdings and significant historical support from the DOJ,166 
this issue continues to be a point of contention.167  For example, this 
 
 158. See FISHER, supra note 63, at 2. 
 159. See, e.g., Appointments During Recess of the Senate, 16 Op. Att’y Gen. 522, 524–25 
(1880). 
 160. Executive Authority To Fill Vacancies, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 631, 633 (1823); see also 
Rappaport, supra note 80, at 1512 (adding that Attorney General Wirt saw an unexpected 
event like a plague, which could prohibit the meeting of Congress, as support for a broad 
RAC interpretation). 
 161. See Rappaport, supra note 80, at 1502.  Of course, this is the prevalent RAC 
interpretation notwithstanding the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in Canning v. NLRB, --- 
F.3d ---, Nos. 12-1115, 12-1153, 2013 WL 276024 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013), discussed 
below. 
 162. See, e.g., The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and 
Congress, 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 161 (1996); Executive Power—Recess Appointments, 33 Op. 
Att’y Gen. 20, 22–23 (1921) [hereinafter Daugherty Opinion] (Attorney General Daugherty 
agreed that when the vacancy occurs is not significant for RAC purposes and cited to over 
eighty years of support in prior Attorney General Opinions); see also HALSTEAD, supra note 
58, at 4–6. 
 163. See In re Farrow, 3 F. 112, 116 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1880) (holding that the President has 
“constitutional power to make [recess] appointment[s] . . . notwithstanding the fact that the 
vacancy filled by [the] appointment first happened when the senate was in session”); see also 
HALSTEAD, supra note 58, at 6. 
 164. See, e.g., United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1012–13 (9th Cir. 1985) (en 
banc) (holding that the President may utilize his power under the RAC to fill vacancies that 
occur while Congress is in session or in recess and that this holding is consistent with 
judicial precedent and Attorney General Opinions).  Thus, the Woodley court “decline[d] to 
adopt [petitioner’s] ‘happen to occur’ argument and recognize[d] the President’s power to 
fill all vacancies that exist during a recess of the senate.” Id. at 1013; see also United States 
v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 712–15 (2d Cir. 1962) (holding the same). 
 165. Allocco, 305 F.2d at 712.  The Allocco court, acknowledging that the RAC could be 
interpreted by some to mean that the RAC applies only to vacancies that occur during Senate 
recesses, justified its position, among other things, because “the logic of words should yield 
to the logic of realities.” Id. at 710 (quoting Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 43 
(1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 166. See, e.g., Recess Appointments, 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 463, 465–66 (1960); Daugherty 
Opinion, supra note 162, at 22–23; President—Recess Appointment—Postmaster, 30 Op. 
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argument was raised recently in Evans v. Stephens,168 during litigation over 
President George W. Bush’s recess appointment of Judge William H. Pryor 
to an Article III judgeship.169  Those challenging the appointment argued, 
inter alia, that because the judicial vacancy did not occur during the recess, 
appointment authority under the RAC could not be constitutionally 
utilized.170  The court, however, maintained the judicial and executive 
branch’s functionalist precedent by holding that the challengers’ 
interpretation of the RAC, “contradicts what we understand to be the 
purpose of the [RAC]:  to keep important offices filled and the government 
functioning.”171 
2.  When is “The Recess of the Senate”?  Intrasession Appointments 
Versus Intersession Appointments 
The Evans attempt to invalidate Judge Pryor’s appointment raised 
another issue common in RAC debates—what is the definition of “the 
Recess” as used in the RAC?172  Some, including the Evans plaintiffs, argue 
that the RAC allows recess appointments only during intersession recesses 
and not intrasession recesses.173  This is a formalist interpretation of the 
RAC favored by those seeking to reign in the President’s recess 
 
Att’y Gen. 314, 315 (1914); Vacancy in Office, 19 Op. Att’y Gen. 261, 263 (1889); 
Vacancies in Office, 18 Op. Att’y Gen. 29, 29 (1884); Appointments During Recess of the 
Senate, 16 Op. Att’y Gen. 522, 524 (1880) (finding that the President’s power to fill 
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Collectorship of Customs for Alaska, 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 455, 457 (1868); President’s Power 
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there is a vacancy, there is a power to fill it.”); President’s Appointing Power, 10 Op. Att’y 
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question can be settled, by the continued practice of your predecessors, and . . . by the 
unbroken acquiescence of the Senate”); Power of President To Appoint to Office During 
Recess of Senate 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 523 (1846); Power of the President To Fill Vacancies, 2 
Op. Att’y Gen. 525 (1832) (advising that the President can make a recess appointment 
regardless of whether the vacancy occurred during a recess or not). 
 167. See, e.g., Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1226–27 (11th Cir. 2004); CHU, supra 
note 66, at 3; WEXLER, supra note 87, at 46–47 (2011). 
 168. 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 169. See id. at 1226–27; WEXLER, supra note 87, at 46–47. 
 170. WEXLER, supra note 87, at 46–47. 
 171. Evans, 387 F.3d at 1227.  The court also observed that Congress must “implicitly 
agree” with this interpretation, as 5 U.S.C. § 5503 (1996) permits salaries for appointees 
filling vacancies that existed while the Senate was in session. See supra notes 76–79 and 
accompanying text.  Again, this interpretation was recently rejected by the D.C. Circuit in 
the 2013 decision discussed below. See infra notes 410–27 and accompanying text. 
 172. See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 80, at 1573 (engaging in the debate over the 
meaning of “the recess” as used in the RAC); WEXLER, supra note 87, at 48–54. 
 173. FISHER, supra note 63, at 3–4; see, e.g., Response Brief of the Plaintiffs-Appellees 
and Amicus Curiae, U.S. Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Pro Se, in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellees’ Motion To Disqualify Member of the Court on the Ground That His Recess 
Appointment Is Invalid at 4–6, Evans, 387 F.3d 1220 (No. 02-16424) [hereinafter Kennedy 
Brief] (arguing that Attorney General Philander Knox’s view, infra notes 179–86 and 
accompanying text, of the different meanings of “recess” and “adjournment” “adopted the 
proper construction of the phrase ‘the Recess’”). 
 2013] TAKING BACK WHAT’S THEIRS 2073 
appointment authority.174  Using this interpretation, the Evans plaintiffs 
argued that because the appointment occurred during an intrasession recess, 
the appointment was invalid.175  The court, in favor of reading “the Recess” 
as meaning any recess, rejected this argument.176  Ensuring that this issue 
would not die with the Evans decision, Justice Stevens, in denying 
certiorari, opined that “it would be a mistake to assume that our disposition 
. . . constitutes a decision on the merits of whether the President has the 
constitutional authority to fill [future vacancies] with appointments made 
absent consent of the Senate during short intrasession ‘recesses.’”177 
The Evans court’s decision follows a long history of legal opinions, 
established after some early disagreement.  In the first official opinion on 
the matter in 1901,178 Attorney General Philander C. Knox made a 
distinction between a “recess” and an “adjournment,”179 later relied upon 
by those challenging the recess appointment in Evans.180  Attorney General 
Knox advised that “recess,” as used in the Constitution, referred only to 
intersession recesses,181 whereas, “adjournment” simply refers to a 
temporary, day-to-day, suspension of business,182 or intrasession recess. 
According to Knox, it is only during this final break, marking the end of 
an existing session—an intersession recess—that the President may use his 
recess appointment authority.183  Knox’s supporters point to the nature of 
the early congressional calendar184 and the relative difficulty of convening 
during an intersession recess, compared to an intrasession recess, at the time 
of the framing.185  This arguably buttresses the view that the Framers only 
intended to allow recess appointments during intersession recess, when they 
could not readily reconvene.186 
However, this position was contradicted and reversed in a 1921 Attorney 
General Opinion by Harry M. Daugherty.187  Daugherty’s notion that the 
terms “recess” and “adjournment” could be used interchangeably, and could 
 
 174. See Rappaport, supra note 80, at 1491. 
 175. Evans, 387 F.3d at 1224–26. 
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 181. See President—Appointment of Officers—Holiday Recess, supra note 179, at 601. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
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refer to either inter- or intrasession breaks, has remained the DOJ’s 
position.188  Since Daugherty’s opinion, the DOJ has consistently held that 
recess appointments during both intersession and intrasession recesses are 
constitutional.189 
In advising President Warren Harding that he could utilize his RAC 
authority during a twenty-eight-day intrasession recess, Attorney General 
Daugherty asserted that the President is vested with a great degree of 
discretion to determine when the Senate is in a “real and genuine” recess, 
rather than requiring the executive to obey strict definitional constructs of 
terms used in the RAC.190  He further noted that the purpose of the 
Constitution was to prevent the President from making appointments 
without the advice and consent of the Senate at a time in which the Senate 
is in session and therefore able to perform its advice and consent 
function.191  Thus, Daugherty found that “the real question . . . is whether in 
a practical sense the Senate is in session so that its advice and consent can 
be obtained.  To give the word ‘recess’ a technical and not a practical 
construction, is to disregard substance for form.”192  It was in this sense that 
Daugherty opted for a functionalist interpretation of the RAC—the 
interpretation that the executive branch relies on to present day.193 
In support of his functionalist approach, Daugherty relied on a Senate 
Judiciary Committee Report194 from early in the twentieth century to settle 
on the essential inquiry to determine whether the President can act pursuant 
to the RAC.195  In making this determination, Daugherty found the most 
helpful inquiries to be:  “Is the adjournment of such duration that the 
members of the Senate owe no duty of attendance?  Is its chamber empty?  
Is the Senate absent so that it can not receive communications from the 
President or participate as a body in making appointments?”196 
Daugherty observed that, to deprive the President of his authority to 
unilaterally appoint officers simply because Congress has adjourned for a 
number of days would lead to “painful and inevitable” government 
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Casey, Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP); Intrasession Recess Appointments, supra note 83, 
at 272–73. 
 190. See Daugherty Opinion, supra note 162, at 25. 
 191. Id. at 21–22. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See, e.g., The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and 
Congress, 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 161 (1996) (“[T]he President has discretion to make a good-
faith determination of whether a given recess is adequate to bring the Clause into play.”); 
infra Part II.C.    
 194. S. REP. NO. 58-4389, at 2 (1905); 39 CONG. REC. 3823–24 (1905) (the report 
determined that a recess should be defined as the time when the Senate “is not sitting in 
regular or extraordinary session as a branch of the Congress, or in extraordinary session 
for the discharge of executive functions”). 
 195. Daugherty Opinion, supra note 162, at 25. 
 196. Id. 
 2013] TAKING BACK WHAT’S THEIRS 2075 
paralysis, which could not have been the Framers’ intent.197  Notably, 
Daugherty did not grant the President unfettered recess appointment 
authority—he advised that an adjournment of as little as two days would 
not meet the “practical” definition of a recess sufficient to trigger RAC 
authority198—a stance echoed in subsequent Opinions.199  The 
Constitution’s silence, and the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari,200 on 
the issue of how long a recess must be before recess appointments can be 
made perpetuates this debate today.201 
Daugherty’s position was, in large part, reiterated by the Evans court in 
holding that whether the recess appointment was made during an 
intersession or intrasession recess had no bearing on the constitutionality of 
the appointment.202  The court observed that neither the text of the RAC, 
nor the historical usage of the term “recess,” points specifically to an 
intersession or intrasession recess.203  The court held that “the main purpose 
of the [RAC]—to enable the President to fill vacancies to assure the proper 
functioning of our government—supports reading both intrasession recesses 
and intersession recesses as within the [RAC].”204  In addition to the textual 
interpretation, the Evans court also relied on the well-established historical 
practice of making recess appointments during intrasession recesses.205 
Because of the RAC’s rationale—to ensure the continuity of the 
government206—one might assume that recess appointments must be made 
early in the recess, when the period of time between the appointment and 
the next available day in which the Senate is scheduled to conduct business 
is at its greatest.207  Yet, there is apparently no authority to support this 
principle,208 and recess appointments have been made as late as 11:30 a.m. 
on the same day the Senate was scheduled to reconvene at noon.209  While 
the OLC has stated its preference that, “ideally [a recess appointment] 
would be made as early as possible in the recess,” the Office has conceded 
that, “[s]uch appointments could be made at any time during the recess.”210 
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3.  Executive Discretion and Manipulation of a Recess 
The RAC’s various interpretations have been illustrated through creative 
manipulation and application by the executive.211  Perhaps no application is 
more creative than President Theodore Roosevelt’s use of the RAC on 
December 7, 1903,212 when he determined that “there is an infinitesimal 
fraction of a second,” when a session is first gaveled in, “which is the recess 
between the two sessions . . . .  [The recess] is so small that no name for it 
can be found.”213  To the dismay of the Senate, Roosevelt used this 
“preposterous”214 period of time on that December morning to appoint 160 
officials,215 including at least some who likely would not have survived the 
Senate confirmation process.216 
Tension arises when the President’s utilization of his recess appointments 
power appears more political than functional.217  There seems to be little 
doubt that the President can make a recess appointment in order to ensure 
the uninterrupted function of the federal government when the Senate is 
unable to perform its advice and consent function,218 but the President 
raises eyebrows when RAC authority is used to appoint an individual 
specifically because the nominee would not survive the Senate’s advice and 
consent process.219  As discussed above, recess appointment authority as an 
ostensible political maneuver is not a new phenomenon.220  Presidents 
George Washington and James Madison were both sharply criticized based 
on their exercise of recess appointment power.221  That is, the RAC can 
be—and historically has been—used to allow the President to appoint 
controversial individuals to high government posts by preventing the Senate 
from performing its constitutional advice and consent duty.222  The use of 
the RAC in this manner is a marked departure from the original purpose for 
the inclusion of the Clause in the Constitution.223 
Because of political disagreements, critical government positions can go 
unfilled for extended periods of time, as was the case with the CFPB.224  
For example, it is clear that the Director’s office at the CFPB was going to 
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be indefinitely vacant unless a Director was recess appointed;225 the Senate 
explicitly refused to offer advice and consent regarding this vacancy.226  
However, as the President is capable of using his RAC authority to further a 
political agenda, so too is the Senate capable of manipulating the 
appointments process for pure political gain.227  The executive branch has 
asserted that RAC authority can be an “important counterbalance” on 
occasions when the Senate, “[b]y refusing to confirm appointees . . . can 
cripple the President’s ability to enforce the law.”228  Today, growing use of 
combative tactics by both branches in the battle to control the appointment 
process has highlighted the contentiousness between the legislative and 
executive branches.229 
Perhaps it is no coincidence, then, that the executive branch relies on 
Presidential discretion to determine when the Senate has truly recessed.230  
As mentioned above, in a significant affirmation of executive power, 
Attorney General Daugherty held that the President is “vested with a large, 
although not unlimited, discretion to determine when there is a real and 
genuine recess . . . .  Every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the 
validity of whatever action he may take.”231  The position that it is left to 
the President’s discretion to determine when the Senate has functionally 
recessed for RAC purposes232 is a stance that has been echoed consistently 
in subsequent opinions.233  The DOJ, however, has conceded that “[g]iving 
advice on how the President may properly exercise that discretion has 
proven a difficult task,”234 and the judiciary has been hesitant to engage this 
issue.235 
II.  THE RECENT EMERGENCE OF RECESS APPOINTMENTS AND 
PRESIDENT OBAMA’S MOST RECENT RECESS APPOINTMENTS 
Part II continues to set the stage for the current interbranch showdown 
over appointment power involving issues in Part I, as well as contemporary 
trends in recess appointments and pro forma sessions.  In examining the 
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specific and novel issues surrounding the January 4, 2012 recess 
appointments, Part II.A surveys the contemporary trends in the 
appointments process, Part II.B details the events surrounding the Cordray 
appointment, and Part II.C features the OLC’s official stance on the matter, 
released only two days after the Cordray and NLRB appointments. 
A.  Contemporary Trends in the RAC Tug-of-War 
The number of recess appointments since the Reagan administration has 
marked a significant increase in the practice, relative to historical 
frequency,236 with President Ronald Reagan utilizing his recess 
appointment authority 240 times and President George H.W. Bush seventy-
seven.237  Through January 23, 2012, President Obama has made thirty-two 
recess appointments, six during intersession recesses and the remainder 
during intrasession recesses; eighteen of these appointments were 
eventually confirmed by the Senate.238  For comparison, at the same point 
in their presidencies, Presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton had made 
sixty-two and twenty recess appointments, respectively.239 
As the rate of recess appointments has changed in recent history, so too 
has the Senate’s attitude toward providing advice and consent.240  A study 
found that from 1885 to 1996, only 4.4 percent of all executive nominations 
to domestic offices failed.241  Of these failures, just four nominations failed 
as a result of actual rejection by the Senate.242  The study determined that 
nominee failure is most often the result of the Senate’s failure to act on the 
nomination.243  Since 1970, the length of time between Presidential 
nomination and eventual consent has increased,244 due in large part to 
increased political polarization.245  In recent years, this trend has grown,246 
and with political polarization at an all-time high, will likely continue to 
increase.247  The Cordray nomination process illustrates this trend.248  
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Notably, each of President Obama’s thirty-two recess appointments through 
January 23, 2012, was preceded by the official nomination of the same 
individual for the same position.249  The average time between each 
nomination and eventual corresponding recess appointment was 216 
days.250  Professor Matthew C. Stephenson has proposed that, in order to 
resolve the growing problem of failure-by-inaction, nominees should be 
considered confirmed if the Senate fails to formally vote against the 
nominee within a reasonable period of time.251  Specifically, Professor 
Stephenson suggests that the Senate’s failure to proactively vote against a 
nominee—an option always available to the chamber—should be viewed as 
the Senate’s tacit approval of confirmation.252  Recall the recent trend of 
stalling nominations, not for the nominee’s lack of qualifications but on 
purely political grounds.253  The Cordray confirmation standoff, 
exemplifying this modern trend, is precisely the type of situation Professor 
Stephenson’s solution might resolve.254   
B.  The Cordray Recess 
On December 17, 2011, the Senate, by unanimous consent, agreed to 
adjourn until January 23, 2012, when the Senate would reconvene for the 
second session of the 112th Congress.255  The Senate further agreed that, 
during this adjournment, it would “convene for pro forma sessions only, 
with no business conducted” every three or four days until January 23, 
2012.256  Pursuant to the Constitution’s Twentieth Amendment,257 the 
Senate convened on Wednesday, January 3, 2012, in pro forma session, to 
commence the second session of the 112th Congress.258 
Senator Mark Warner gaveled in the January 3rd session at 12:01:32 
p.m.259 and, after 41 seconds,260 adjourned the Senate until the next pro 
forma session, scheduled three days later.  On January 4, 2012, despite 
strong partisan opposition,261 and a lack of adjournment pursuant to the 
 
 249. See HOGUE & BEARDEN, supra note 60, at 7. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Stephenson, supra note 19, at 946. 
 252. Id. 
 253. See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text. 
 254. Stephenson, supra note 19, at 946. 
 255. 157 CONG. REC. S8783 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2011) (statement of Sen. Wyden); see 
also HOGUE & BEARDEN, supra note 60, at 11–12. 
 256. 157 CONG. REC. S8783 (statement of Sen. Wyden) (emphasis added). 
 257. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2 (requiring Congress to meet on January 3 of each year, 
unless otherwise provided by law). 
 258. 158 CONG. REC. S1 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2012); see also 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 
25. 
 259. 158 CONG. REC. S1. 
 260. Id. 
 261. See, e.g., Ben Feller, AP Sources:  Obama Bucks GOP, OKs Consumer Watchdog, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 4, 2012, 9:46 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/
ap/financialnews/D9S26CO02.htm; Scott Wong & Josh Boak, Republicans Stands Solidly 
Against Richard Cordray, POLITICO (Dec. 7, 2011, 1:11 PM), http://www.politico.com/
news/stories/1211/69984.html. 
 2080 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
Adjournment Clause, President Obama announced his intent to recess 
appoint four individuals to vacant positions, including Richard Cordray for 
CFPB Director.262  As discussed above, the CFPB had existed since its 
creation without a director until Cordray’s appointment.263  The absence of 
formal stewardship at the CFPB was not for lack of trying—President 
Obama nominated Cordray six months prior to Cordray’s eventual recess 
appointment.264  And, despite support from a majority of senators,265 the 
Senate Republicans effectively blocked confirmation.266 
At the time, Obama and his Administration justified the decision to 
utilize the power granted under the RAC, dismissing the significance of pro 
forma sessions as a “gimmick,”267 and stressing that the country “can’t 
wait” for Senate advice and consent.268  The Obama Administration’s 
position that pro forma sessions do not sufficiently interrupt a recess for 
RAC purposes is memorialized in the OLC’s response to the 
Administration’s inquiry on the matter.269 
C.  January 2012 OLC Opinion 
In answering whether the recess appointments were permissible during 
the twenty-day intrasession recess, punctuated with periodic pro forma 
sessions, from January 3, 2011, to January 23, 2011, the OLC responded by 
dividing the question into two issues.270  First, could the President make a 
recess appointment during the intrasession recess of twenty days?  Based in 
large part on prior Attorney General Opinions from both parties, judicial 
authority—particularly, Evans—and historical practice discussed above, the 
answer was affirmatively, yes.271  The second, “novel,” issue addressed by 
the OLC was whether periodic pro forma sessions throughout a recess 
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preclude the President from utilizing his authority under the RAC.272  The 
OLC answered that the pro forma sessions at issue did not preclude RAC 
action.273 
Regarding the first question, in recognizing that “[t]he President may 
make appointments under the [RAC] during an intrasession recess of the 
Senate that is of substantial length,”274 the OLC advised, consistent with 
executive branch precedent,275 that a twenty-day recess is of sufficient 
length to trigger RAC action.276  The OLC gives weight to historical 
practice—including Congressional acquiescence,277 buttressed by a similar 
view taken by the courts278—as a guide to illustrate the permissibility of 
intrasession appointments during recesses of similar, or shorter, duration.279  
Evans is “the only federal court of appeals decision squarely on point”280 
and upheld a recess appointment made during an eleven-day recess.281  
Notably, the OLC observes that the previous five Presidents have all made 
intrasession recess appointments during recesses of fourteen days or 
fewer.282 
As for the second question, the OLC based its answer largely on 
executive and judicial branch sources, including the functionalist Daugherty 
Opinion,283 an extensive subsequent history of Attorney General Opinions, 
and available judicial precedent.284  In finding that pro forma sessions do 
not interrupt a recess of the Senate in a way that would foreclose the 
President’s ability to make recess appointments under the RAC,285 the OLC 
looked largely to Daugherty’s practical RAC interpretation—focusing on 
the Senate’s ability to perform its advice and consent function.286  In this 
 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id.; see also id. at 9 (“[P]ro forma sessions of this sort do[] not have the legal effect 
of interrupting the recess of the Senate for purposes of the [RAC] and . . . the President may 
properly conclude that the Senate is unavailable for the overall duration of the recess.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 274. Intrasession Recess Appointments, supra note 83, at 271. 
 275. See 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25, at 5–6. 
 276. Id. at 5 (“We have little doubt that a twenty-day recess may give rise to presidential 
authority to make recess appointments.”). 
 277. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
 278. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.  The opinion states that “[w]hile there is 
little judicial precedent addressing the President’s authority to make intrasession recess 
appointments, what decisions there are uniformly conclude the President does have such 
authority.” 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25, at 8. 
 279. 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25, at 6. 
 280. Id. at 8. 
 281. Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1224–26 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 282.  2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25, at 7. 
 283. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.  The opinion states that “in our 
judgment, [pro forma] sessions do not interrupt the intrasession recess in a manner that 
would preclude the President from determining that the Senate remains unavailable 
throughout to ‘receive communications from the President or participate as a body in making 
appointments.’” 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25, at 1 (quoting Intrasession Recess 
Appointments, supra note 83, at 272). 
 284. See 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25, at 11–12. 
 285. Id. at 1. 
 286. See id. at 4. 
 2082 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
sense, the Opinion is very much aligned with relevant judiciary and 
executive branch precedent.287  The OLC correctly288 predicted, however, 
that litigation over this recess appointment is a risk, considering the novelty 
of the overall question.289 
Citing various commentaries and Attorney General Opinions since the 
founding,290 the OLC notes that the RAC has been interpreted in 
accordance with its purpose291 “that there be an uninterrupted power to fill 
federal offices.”292  Relying on the Daugherty opinion and the 1905 Senate 
report, the OLC reiterates that the RAC is implicated when the Senate is 
practically unable to advise and consent.293  That is, whether it is practically 
possible for the Senate to convene and dispense its advice and consent is the 
dispositive issue for the OLC in determining whether the Senate is in recess 
in “the constitutional sense.”294 
Finally, the OLC lays forth three considerations on which it rests its 
conclusion that pro forma sessions do not interrupt a Senate recess for RAC 
purposes.295  First, the OLC recites the executive and legislative branches’ 
belief that “recess” be defined in practical terms.296  In drawing out this 
point, the OLC distinguishes between, on the one hand, the Senate 
legitimately starving the President of recess appointment authority by 
staying continuously in session,297 remaining able to advise and consent, 
and on the other hand, convening only in pro forma session during which 
no business is to be—or can be—conducted.298  For the OLC, it is the latter 
scenario in which the President can rightfully use his discretion to 
determine that the Senate is in genuine recess. 
Second, the OLC asserts that equating pro forma sessions to legitimate 
Senate meetings contravenes the RAC’s purpose.299  An established 
mechanism to fill critical vacancies when the Senate is unable to perform its 
constitutional function is neutralized if the Senate can effectively disable 
the mechanism, even when the Senate itself cannot conduct any business.300 
The OLC also draws similarities between the recess at issue and long 
intersession recesses during which appointments have been made since 
 
 287. See, e.g., id. at 11 n.16.  OLC noted, “We draw on the analysis developed by this 
Office when it first considered the issue.” Id. at 4 (citing Memorandum from John P. 
Elwood, OLC, Re:  Lawfulness of Making Recess Appointments During Adjournment of the 
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 288. See discussion infra Part III.A.1. 
 289. 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25, at 4. 
 290. See id. at 10–11. 
 291. See id. 
 292. Id. at 11. 
 293. See id. at 10–12. 
 294. Id. at 12. 
 295. See id. at 13–18. 
 296. Id. at 13–15. 
 297. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, supra note 49, at 361 (Alexander Hamilton); supra text 
accompanying note 65. 
 298. 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25, at 17–18. 
 299. See id. at 15. 
 300. See id. 
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President Washington’s Administration.301  As noted above, starting on 
December 17, 2011, the recess at issue spanned the final seventeen days of 
the first session of the 112th Congress and the first twenty days of the 
second session, totaling thirty-seven days and “closely resembl[ing] a 
lengthy intersession recess.”302  Therefore, the RAC should apply to this 
recess in the same way it does to recesses similar in character.303 
The third consideration raises separation of powers concerns.304  The 
OLC submits that, in light of the express constitutional authority of the 
President to make recess appointments, any effort to undermine this power 
would improperly tip the balance of power among the branches of 
government.305  The OLC cites Supreme Court jurisprudence in holding 
that congressional acts cannot impermissibly “‘undermine[ ]’ the powers of 
the Executive Branch . . . or ‘disrupt[ ] the proper balance between the 
coordinate branches [by] prevent[ing] the Executive Branch from 
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.’”306  Practices 
designed exclusively to limit the President’s RAC power seemingly run 
contrary to a government designed to “restrict[] each branch to its 
sphere.”307  Certainly, though, some critics argue the converse—that recess 
appointments are a usurpation of Congress’s power by the executive, as 
they deprive the Senate of its constitutional appointment role.308 
The OLC also addressed a variety of counterarguments—some of which 
are discussed below—that might weigh against the conclusion that the 
President could properly make recess appointments between January 3, 
2012, and January 23, 2012.  One such argument is that pro forma sessions 
are meaningful because, in other contexts, they have been found to satisfy 
certain constitutional requirements.309  Namely, the requirements that 
neither chamber adjourn for more than three days without the consent of the 
other310 and that Congress convene on January 3rd of each year.311  The 
OLC distinguishes the aforementioned uses of pro forma sessions as mere 
“housekeeping,” that “affect the Legislative Branch alone,”312 and that the 
use of such sessions should not affect the President’s broad grant of 
discretion to determine when the Senate is unavailable to perform its advice 
and consent function for RAC purposes.313 
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 309. 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25, at 18. 
 310. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4; see supra Part I.C. 
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 312. 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25, at 19. 
 313. Id. at 19–20 (“[W]hether the House has consented to the Senate’s adjournment of 
more than three days does not determine the Senate’s practical availability during a period of 
 2084 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
Another counterargument addressed by the OLC is, because the Senate 
has the constitutional authority to “determine the Rules of its 
Proceedings,”314 the President must abide by the Senate’s determination of 
whether the body has recessed for purposes of the RAC.315  The OLC relies 
on federal case law to observe that, when Congress makes a rule that affects 
individuals outside of the legislative branch, that rule may be subject to 
judicial review.316  As any type of rule created for the purpose of preventing 
recess appointments would affect the executive branch and the potential 
appointee,317 it could be subject to review.  Relatedly, the constitutionality 
of the indirect legislative methods enacted by Congress to protect its advice 
and consent power318 has not been adjudicated,319 and questions remain as 
to whether such legislation could pass constitutional muster.320  However, 
the OLC believes a rule declaring the Senate in session when it is unable to 
advise and consent is likely untenable,321 just as it would be impermissible 
for the President to use his discretion to declare the Senate unable to advise 
and consent when, practically speaking, the Senate is able to perform such a 
function.322 
Importantly, the OLC acknowledges that in 2011 alone, the Senate 
passed legislation—thus, arguably conducting business—on two different 
occasions while it was in pro forma session.323  The legislation was agreed 
to by unanimous consent, and it is through this same practice that one could 
argue the Senate might advise and consent to a nominee during a pro forma 
session.324  The OLC maintains, however, that the President can still 
reasonably rely on the Senate’s declaration that “no business” will be 
conducted during the pro forma sessions and, if he does properly conclude 
that the Senate cannot provide advice and consent, then he can lawfully 
make recess appointments.325 
Finally, the OLC addresses whether the DOJ had previously taken the 
position that regular pro forma sessions might preclude RAC action.326  In 
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the proceedings surrounding New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB,327 the DOJ, 
in a letter to the Supreme Court, considered whether a three-day recess 
could trigger the RAC.328  The OLC notes that DOJ did not directly answer 
the three-day recess question, but rather focused on the “uncertain status of 
recess appointments during intrasession recesses of three or fewer days to 
argue that the possibility of recess appointments did not render New 
Process Steel moot.”329  Thus, the DOJ did not actually answer the question 
regarding pro forma sessions presently at issue.330 
III.  THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OVER APPOINTMENTS 
At the precipice of the RAC debates outlined in Parts I and II stands the 
issue of whether pro forma sessions sufficiently interrupt a recess for 
purposes of the RAC.  The dueling RAC interpretations discussed above 
have direct consequences on the validity of the Cordray appointment.331  
The novelty of the issue, combined with “a lack of judicial precedent that 
may otherwise elucidate the [RAC],”332 makes it “difficult to predict how a 
reviewing court would define the contours of the President’s recess 
appointment authority.”333  The divisive positions in academia and all three 
branches of government334 surround the question of whether the Cordray—
and NLRB—appointments were made during a three-day recess between 
the January 3 and January 6, 2012 pro forma sessions335 or a twenty-day 
intrasession recess beginning the second session of the 112th Congress, 
from January 3 to January 23.336  This part will explore some of the 
hypothetical and actual issues pertinent in current and prospective litigation 
challenging the validity of the January 4, 2012 appointments.  This 
information will help highlight the current conflict over the scope of RAC 
powers and the significance of pro forma sessions.  This discussion will be 
based on briefs from relevant suits, nonpartisan reports from CRS, and prior 
case law and executive branch opinions. 
In sum, Senate Republicans, and others who oppose the CFPB, claim that 
President Obama exceeded his constitutional authority because the Senate’s 
recess at the time of Cordray’s appointment was not of sufficient duration—
due to regular pro forma sessions—to warrant the use of the President’s 
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recess appointment power.337  On the other hand, supporters argue that the 
President’s constitutional authority to make such an appointment is nearly 
beyond dispute,338 as pro forma sessions do not interrupt a recess.339  One 
broad perspective is that the Cordray appointment simply implemented the 
will of the majority, as fifty-three senators voted to advance the Cordray 
nomination.340 
A.  Novel Points of Contention 
While the most recent dispute over whether pro forma sessions 
sufficiently interrupt a recess is cut across partisan lines,341 support for the 
OLC’s January 2012 position has come from both parties.  In addition to 
the OLC’s 2012 opinion, two former DOJ officials under President George 
W. Bush characterized this use of pro forma sessions as a “bluff” that 
“undermin[es] what the Founders viewed as an essential tool for the 
effective functioning of our government.”342  A number of legal experts 
have already taken the position that, upon judicial review, a court is likely 
to affirm the OLC’s position that pro forma sessions do not meaningfully 
interrupt a recess.343 
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Like their successors, the Bush officials leaned on the 1905 Senate 
Report344 and the Daugherty Opinion discussed above to support their 
conclusion,345 which ultimately rests on the unconstitutionality of using pro 
forma sessions to starve the President of his constitutionally bestowed 
appointment power.346  Indeed, there are alternative methods of hampering 
the President’s appointment power including restrictions on the appointee’s 
salary, limiting agency funding, and thwarting the President’s legislative 
agenda.347  Finally, former Bush officials, and others,348 acknowledge that 
if debate surrounding the significance of pro forma sessions continues, the 
ultimate resolution may be left to the courts.349 
1.  Pro Forma Sessions and the RAC in Litigation 
The 2012 OLC Opinion alluded to the fact that, the shorter the 
intrasession recess, the higher the risk might be of having a recess 
appointment overturned through litigation.350  A great degree of uncertainty 
surrounds the outcome of such litigation, however, due to the limited 
judicial authority available on the issue.351  Although, at this point, analysis 
of litigation surrounding the Cordray appointment is mostly prospective, the 
nonpartisan and authoritative CRS352 compiled a report detailing what such 
litigation might look like.353  Additionally, at least one lawsuit attempting 
to invalidate the Cordray nomination has already been filed,354 and on 
January 25, 2013, in Canning v. NLRB,355 the D.C. Circuit invalidated the 
three NLRB appointments made by President Obama at the same time he 
appointed Cordray.356  These sources and related documents are helpful in 
illustrating the novel points of contention surrounding the Cordray 
appointment, and provide the basis for much of the following in this 
subsection. 
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a.  The CFPB Challenge 
Nonbank financial companies that are subject to CFPB rules or 
enforcement action are likely to be among the entities that challenge the 
validity of the Cordray appointment in the future.357  Recess appointments 
of the Cordray character—during the three-day period between pro forma 
sessions—raise questions surrounding justiciability, namely whether a 
plaintiff has sufficient standing to bring suit, and whether the issue itself 
invokes the political question doctrine.358  Regarding the critical question of 
standing,359 the potential plaintiffs perhaps most likely to meet the 
requirements for litigation are the aforementioned nonbank financial entities 
that have felt some specific putative harm as a result of a discrete action by 
the CFPB.360  Such plaintiffs would likely challenge a ruling or 
enforcement action taken by the CFPB—after Cordray’s appointment—on 
the grounds that the Director lacked authority to take such action as a result 
of his invalid appointment,361 akin to the strategy of the Evans and Canning 
plaintiffs.362 
In fact, at least one complaint challenging the Cordray appointment has 
been filed on behalf of several plaintiffs, including a Texas-based bank, in 
Big Spring v. Geithner.363  In order to combat a purported chilling effect on 
financial institutions as a result of the CFPB’s “unlimited power” to 
determine what constitutes “unfair, deceptive, or abusive” acts on an ad hoc 
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basis,364 the plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that Cordray’s nomination is 
unconstitutional.365  They therefore request that the court “enjoin[] Cordray 
from carrying out any of the powers delegated to the office of CFPB 
Director by [Dodd-Frank].”366 
Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that the Senate was not in a recess 
sufficient to trigger RAC action because:  The body (1) can declare its own 
rules and procedures and did not declare itself in recess during the time in 
question, (2) was not recessed pursuant to the Adjournment Clause at the 
time of the Cordray nomination, and (3) did, in fact, pass legislation during 
the recess in question, and therefore the recess appointment was an 
unconstitutional act.367  As discussed above in Part II.C, the OLC 
anticipated and responded to each of these points.  Still in the pleading 
stages, the government, in late 2012, moved to dismiss, claiming that all 
plaintiffs lack the “core requirements” of standing.368  Thus, how the court 
will handle the justiciability and interpretative issues remains to be seen. 
b.  The D.C. Circuit’s 2013 RAC Doctrine 
In implementing a similar strategy to attack the companion January 4, 
2012 recess appointments,369 a Pepsi bottling company appealed to the D.C. 
Circuit to invalidate a ruling by the NLRB.370  In Canning, the plaintiff 
corporation, subject to an adverse ruling by the Board, challenged the five-
member Board’s ability to act, claiming that the NLRB lacked the three-
member quorum necessary to render rulings.371  The three members in 
question were appointed at the same time as Cordray,372 and the plaintiffs 
allege that the appointments did not occur during a recess sufficient to 
trigger the RAC.373  This argument is based on the plaintiff’s theory that 
pro forma sessions do, in fact, interrupt recesses for RAC purposes and, 
therefore, the Senate never properly recessed during the time in question, 
making any RAC action improper.374  
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In an amicus brief on behalf of the plaintiffs, forty-two Republican 
members of the Senate supported this argument, based largely on the 
Senate’s ability to make the rules of its proceedings and declare itself in—
or out of—recess.375  Like the Big Spring plaintiffs, the senators argue that 
the President cannot usurp that authority by unilaterally deciding that the 
Senate has recessed and appointing officials pursuant to the RAC.376  These 
senators state that because the Senate had not adjourned pursuant to the 
Adjournment Clause, it “hardly could be deemed in ‘Recess’ when it was 
constitutionally bound to be in session.”377  Therefore, in an apparent 
rebuke378 to the belief that the President has discretion to determine what 
constitutes a recess for RAC purposes,379 Senate Republicans assert that it 
is in the Senate’s hands to determine the chamber “expressly and 
unambiguously” in—or out of—session, pursuant to the Rules of 
Proceedings Clause.380  Again, like Big Spring, the senators posit that even 
if the President could make a determination as to whether the Senate has 
recessed for RAC purposes, pro forma sessions are decidedly not de facto 
recesses, especially considering the Senate’s willingness to pass legislation 
during such sessions.381  In sum, the senators submit that, in making the 
January 4, 2012 recess appointments, the President “conflate[d] the 
chamber’s unavailability to act with its unwillingness to do so.”382 
On the other hand, the government’s brief mirrors many of the 
functionalist arguments383 from the 2012 OLC opinion384 and a long line of 
executive precedent385 to argue that the recess appointments occurred 
during a twenty-day break and were constitutional.386  The government’s 
stance is rooted in the “well-understood meaning long employed by both 
the Legislative and Executive Branches,” that a recess of the Senate refers 
“to a break from the Senate’s usual business.”387  Therefore, the 
government contends, inter alia, that the Senate’s unanimous announcement 
that it would conduct no business during the twenty-day period in question 
is, in effect, an announcement by the Senate that it would go into recess 
despite regular pro forma sessions.388  Based on the fact that no business 
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was actually conducted during the twenty-day period in question,389 and 
applying the Daugherty functionalist standard,390 the government 
concludes, “[T]here is no question that . . . the Senate was in recess from 
January 3 to January 23, 2012, notwithstanding the periodic pro forma 
sessions.”391  With specific regard to the “rules of proceedings” argument 
anticipated by the OLC,392 the DOJ observed that “[the Senate] passed no 
rule or resolution setting forth the conclusion that the Senate was not in 
recess for purposes of the [RAC].”393  The DOJ also made reference to a 
“shared understanding” for more than a century between the executive and 
legislative branches that a recess is defined by whether the Senate is—or is 
not—conducting work.394  Further, the rules of proceedings power is 
granted to the extent that it solely affects the legislative branch—thus rules 
that act to limit the power of the executive branch are not permissible.395 
The DOJ also responds to claims that the Senate was expressly not in 
recess by pointing out that the Senate referred to the break in question as a 
“recess” in various resolutions.396  The DOJ thus concluded that, between 
January 3 and January 23, 2012, based on an established definition of 
recess, “there was a ‘Recess of the Senate’ here:  the Senate had provided 
by binding order that it would conduct no business during its January break; 
it in fact conducted no business during that break; and it referred to its 
January break as a ‘recess.’”397 
Also, as predicted by the OLC,398 Senate Republicans contend that the 
President’s reliance on the Senate’s announcement that they will conduct no 
business is unfounded,399 because the Senate did conduct business in a 
similar situation in 2011.400  In response, the DOJ observes that, even when 
the Senate recesses pursuant to the Adjournment Clause, it is still possible 
for the Senate to cut short its recess by reconvening on a date earlier than 
originally agreed upon401 in the requisite resolution passed prior to 
recessing.402  Thus, the Senate is seemingly capable of “chang[ing] its mind 
and conduct[ing] business”403 whether or not the Senate has recessed 
pursuant to the Adjournment Clause, or is in pro forma session in which no 
business is to be conducted.404 
 
 389. See id. at 11–12.  The DOJ notes that “[t]he Senate considered no bills, held no 
votes, and passed no legislation.  No speeches were made, no debates held.” Id. at 23. 
 390. See, e.g., id. at 38–39. 
 391. Id. at 39. 
 392. See supra notes 314–22 and accompanying text. 
 393. NLRB Brief, supra note 110, at 56. 
 394. See Schoenberg, supra note 358. 
 395. See NLRB Brief, supra note 110, at 57–58. 
 396. Id. at 56–57. 
 397. Id. at 48. 
 398. See supra notes 323–25 and accompanying text. 
 399. McConnell Brief, supra note 341, at 26–27. 
 400. Id. at 25–26. 
 401. NLRB Brief, supra note 110, at 41–42. 
 402. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text. 
 403. McConnell Brief, supra note 341, at 27. 
 404. See NLRB Brief, supra note 110, at 41–42. 
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The DOJ further observes that the orders providing for adjournment 
punctuated with pro forma sessions are, functionally, “indistinguishable” 
from concurrent recess resolutions passed pursuant to the Adjournment 
Clause.405  In fact, the Government asserts that it may actually be easier to 
cut short a recess approved by concurrent resolution pursuant to the 
Adjournment Clause than it would have been to agree to conduct business 
during the January 3 to January 23, 2012 break.406  This is because, since 
the Senate agreed to “conduct no business” by unanimous consent, only a 
superseding unanimous consent agreement could have brought the Senate 
back to Washington to conduct business during this time.407  By contrast, 
reconvening after an Adjournment Clause recess often only requires an 
agreement between the few senators who hold leadership positions.408  
Thus, in the former, unanimous consent, pro forma situation, any single 
Senator can derail plans to conduct business prior to the agreed upon date, 
whereas in the latter, Adjournment Clause recess, the Senate can conduct 
business sooner than planned at the behest of only a few senators.409 
On January 25, 2013, the three-judge D.C. Circuit panel that presided 
over Canning unanimously flipped the current RAC landscape on its head 
by invalidating President Obama’s NLRB recess appointments.410  Despite 
the arguments detailed above, the court based its decision on its 
interpretation of “the Recess” and “happen” as used in the RAC,411 arriving 
at a conclusion that puts the D.C. Circuit squarely at odds with its sister 
circuits’ decisions since the nineteenth century,412 including the Eleventh 
Circuit in Evans,413 the Second Circuit in United States v. Allocco,414 the 
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Woodley,415 and well over a century of 
consistent executive branch precedent.416  In ruling that recess 
appointments can be made only during intersession recesses for vacancies 
that arise during that particular recess, the court’s decision, if upheld, would 
 
 405. Id. at 38. 
 406. Id. at 42. 
 407. Id. at 40 (“[A] unanimous consent agreement is a binding order of the Senate that 
can be overridden only through a new unanimous consent agreement.”). 
 408. Id. at 42. 
 409. See id. 
 410. Canning v. NLRB, Nos. 12-1115, 12-1153, 2013 WL 276024, at *23–24 (D.C. Cir. 
Jan. 25, 2013) (holding that three NLRB members were not validly appointed and vacating 
the underlying NLRB order against the petitioners).   
 411. Id. at *16 (“In short, we hold that ‘the Recess’ is limited to intersession recesses); id. 
at *21 (“[T]he original public meaning of “happen” was “arise,” [thus] we hold that the 
President may only make recess appointments to fill vacancies that arise during the recess 
. . .”). 
 412. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 413. See Melanie Trottman et al., Court Throws Out Recess Picks, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 26, 
2013), at A1; supra notes 168–71, 202–05 and accompanying text. 
 414. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 415. See supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text. 
 416. See Trottman et al., supra note 159–60, 413 and accompanying text. 
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all but eliminate the President’s recess appointment power.417  Restricting 
valid recess appointments to such a limited window would call into 
question nearly 300418 prior appointments by President Obama and other 
presidents, and the validity of the seemingly settled actions taken by these 
appointees.419 
Notwithstanding the extensive discussions in the litigants’ briefings,420 
the Canning court conspicuously did not address the novel issue of whether 
pro forma sessions can sufficiently break up a recess to prevent recess 
appointments.  As mentioned above, the court instead made its decision on 
a largely formalist and originalist interpretation of “the Recess” and 
“happen,” “as [the phrases] would have been understood at the time of the 
ratification,”421 relying on contemporaneous documents and actions.422  In 
fact, one former DOJ official from the George W. Bush Administration 
noted that the panel “would have benefitted from extensive briefing” on 
these interpretational issues.423  That is, the panel left unaddressed the novel 
 
 417. Charlie Savage & Steve Greenhouse, Court Rejects Obama Move To Fill Posts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2013, at A1.  Notably, one judge found that the court should not disturb the 
“suspect” practice of filling vacancies that do not arise during the recess in which the recess 
appointment is made, based on the executive branch’s “longstanding interpretation of the 
Constitution” and extensive practice of making such appointments. Canning, 2013 WL 
276024, at *24 (Griffith, J., concurring).  
 418. Jay Carney, White House Press Sec., Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney 
(Jan. 25, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/25/press-
briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-1252013 (stating that the D.C. Circuit’s decision calls 
into question approximately 280 recess appointments made over the past 150 years). 
 419. Savage & Greenhouse, supra note 417.  In an extreme illustration of this point, 
speaking with respect to recess-appointed Article III judges like in the Evans case, a former 
DOJ official under President George W. Bush said there may even be “people sitting in 
prisons . . . who will be very excited when they learn of this ruling.” Id. (quoting John 
Elwood, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General under George W. Bush).  Conservative 
and liberal commentators alike have criticized the Canning opinion, characterizing it as 
everything from “a tad doctrinaire,” to “an extravagant act of judicial hubris.” Garrett Epps, 
What Did the Word “The” Mean in 1755? And Why Does the Court Care?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 
1, 2013, 4:08 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/02/what-did-the-word-
the-mean-in-1755-and-why-does-the-court-care/272773/.  However, at least one supporter of 
the opinion greeted it as a check on “executive power tyranny.” Id.  Yet, in perhaps the most 
colorful criticism of the ruling, Professor Peter Shane, the Jacob E. Davis and Jacob E. Davis 
II Chair in Law at the Ohio State University’s Moritz College of Law, commented, “[t]he 
[Canning] opinion . . . is a little like a Rob Schneider movie—the more you think about it, 
the worse it seems.” Peter M. Shane, Two More Reasons Why the D.C. Circuit Was 
“Wrong” and “Wrong” on Recess Appointments, SHANE REACTIONS (Jan. 30, 2013, 2:57 
PM), http://shanereactions.wordpress.com/2013/01/30/two-more-reasons-why-the-d-c-circuit
-was-wrong-and-wrong-on-recess-appointments/. 
 420. See supra notes 369–409 and accompanying text. 
 421. Canning, 2013 WL 276024, at *8 (“The interpretation of the [RAC] in the years 
immediately following the Constitution’s ratification is the most instructive historical 
analysis in discerning the original meaning.  Indeed, such early interpretation is a ‘critical 
tool of constitutional interpretation . . . .’” (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 544 U.S. 
570, 605 (2008))). 
 422. Id. at *10. 
 423. John Elwood, DC Circuit Strikes Down President Obama’s Recess Appointments, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 25, 2013, 11:24 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/25/dc-
circuit-strikes-down-president-obamas-recess-appointments/.  Specifically, the court relied 
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issue of whether periodic pro forma sessions over a period of extended 
adjournment can strip the President of his recess appointment authority.424  
In any event, as explained above, the court’s decision to interpret the RAC 
“as it would have been understood at the time of the ratification,”425 leaves 
open questions.426  Namely, whether the use of pro forma sessions can strip 
the President of his RAC authority—the primary conflict explored in this 
Note.  The Obama Administration maintains that this “unprecedented” 
decision that “contradicts 150 years of practice by Democratic and 
Republican administrations . . . has no bearing on Richard Cordray.”427   
2.  Intrasession Versus Intersession, Rehashed 
Though some view the issue as largely settled,428 it is worth briefly 
revisiting the controversy over whether the RAC applies to both 
intrasession and intersession recesses, as the parties to current litigation429 
 
heavily on the “dearth of intrasession appointments” during the years following the 
ratification. Canning, 2013 WL 276024, at *15.  However, as this Note discusses above and 
Elwood makes clear, intrasession recesses did not become common practice until decades 
after the ratification of the Constitution. See Elwood, supra; supra notes 91–95 and 
accompanying text. 
 424. As its decision rested on issues that the litigants had not briefed to a serious extent, 
the government might decide to request a rehearing en banc. Elwood, supra note 423. Such a 
petition may be filed contemporaneously with its almost inevitable petition for certiorari. See 
id.; see also Trottman et al., supra note 413.  The Obama Administration “disagree[s] 
strongly with the decision.” Carney, supra note 418. 
 425. Canning, 2013 WL 276024, at *8.  
 426. It seems unlikely that the Framers would have understood that a procedural 
mechanism, implemented for the sole purpose of preventing recess appointments, would 
allow the Senate to remain both in session according to the Adjournment Clause and 
simultaneously unable to advise and consent.  In declining to discuss the novel pro forma 
issue, the D.C. Circuit did not address this point. 
 427. Carney, supra note 418; see also Trottman et al., supra note 413.  While Canning 
has no direct impact on Cordray or the CFPB, the decision might add leverage to Senate 
Republicans’ demands for changes to the CFPB. See Trottman et al., supra note 413.  In fact, 
the two cases appear distinguishable, and a court deciding on Cordray’s validity may want to 
reconcile the D.C. Circuit’s new RAC doctrine with the inherent structural differences 
between the NLRB and CFPB.  That is, the NLRB is a five-member panel that has existed 
since the Great Depression, see Our History, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-
history (last visited Feb. 15, 2013), while the CFPB is a new agency, led by a single director, 
created in response to the 2008 financial crisis. See discussion supra Part I.A.  Again, 
notably, Richard Cordray holds the distinction of serving as the CFPB’s first-ever Director. 
  Further, the D.C. Circuit supports its originalist argument by noting the Framers’ 
implementation of the advice and consent process as a check against unfit appointees. 
Canning, 2013 WL 276024, at *11.  A court hearing a similar case may wish to comment on 
the modern trend exemplified in the Cordray proceedings of objecting to a nominee—not on 
the grounds of the nominee’s qualifications and character—but as a shortcut around the 
legislative process. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; infra notes 455–56 and 
accompanying text.  Lastly, as mentioned above, the main issue in this latest recess 
appointments controversy—and this Note—was not addressed by the court, leaving the 
validity of using pro forma sessions as a recess appointment bludgeon as perplexing as ever. 
 428. See generally Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004); CARPENTER ET AL., 
supra note 34, at 4 n.23; 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25, at 8 n.12; Evans Intervening 
Brief, supra note 79. 
 429. Brief for Canning, supra note 373, at *71–73. 
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and the D.C. Circuit have revived the issue.430  Those opposed to 
intrasession recess appointments sometimes point to the disparate term 
length between an intrasession and intersession recess appointee.431  The 
RAC stipulates that the term of recess appointees expires at the “End of 
their next session,” which means the sine die adjournment of the next 
session.432  Thus, term lengths will vary depending on when an individual is 
appointed.433  For example, if the appointment is made during the 
intersession break, then the appointment will last for approximately one 
year—until the end of the session that begins immediately after the 
intersession recess. 
By contrast, if the appointment is during an intrasession recess, then the 
appointee will serve for the remainder of the current session, in addition to 
the entire subsequent session434—that is, the “End of their next Session.”435  
The curious result that an intrasession appointee’s term could be twice as 
long as an intersession appointee’s term, weighs—for some—in favor of 
allowing recess appointments only during intersession recesses.436  Perhaps 
this explains why President Obama waited until the second day of the new 
session to make the intrasession Cordray appointment;437 this effectively 
doubled the duration of Cordray’s term compared to what his term would 
have been had he been appointed during an intersession recess.438 
3.  The Future of the RAC in Court 
Despite the belief of some legal experts that the Cordray appointment is 
on firm legal ground439 and that “the courts would probably have a burden 
to explain why they don’t agree with [the January 2012 OLC opinion],”440 
the possibility that the appointments would be challenged in court was 
expected.441  CRS observes that a reviewing court could approach the 
question of the significance of pro forma sessions in at least three ways.442  
 
 430. See, e.g., id.; James O’Connell, A Brief Look at Recess Appointments, ANTITRUST 
SOURCE, Sept. 2004, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/
antitrust_source/Sep04OConnell.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 431. See, e.g., McConnell Brief, supra note 341, at 27; Brief for Canning, supra note 373, 
at *71–72; Carrier, supra note 89, at 2240–41. 
 432. HOGUE, supra note 91, at 5. 
 433. Carrier, supra note 89, at 2240–41. 
 434. See Intrasession Recess Appointments, supra note 83, at 273; HOGUE, supra note 91, 
at 5. 
 435. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 3. 
 436. See, e.g., Brief for Canning, supra 373, at 71–72; Carrier, supra note 89, at 2241 
(“Allowing recess appointments during intrasession recesses thus leads to unusual results 
that may tilt the balance of power in the appointment process.”). 
 437. McConnell Brief, supra note 341, at 27. 
 438. Recall that, notwithstanding the pro forma sessions, the recess during which Cordray 
was appointed spanned both intersession and intrasession periods, starting on December 17, 
2011, through January, 23, 2011. See 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25, at *1. 
 439. See Parker, supra note 343. 
 440. Id. (quoting Michael Gerhardt, Professor of Law, UNC-Chapel Hill). 
 441. See, e.g., Comizio & Jabour, supra note 337, at 6–7. 
 442. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 34, at 17–18. 
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First, a court could simply find that pro forma sessions always constitute 
meaningful sessions for RAC purposes; second, a court could find that a pro 
forma session is a standard session only if actual business is conducted; and 
third, a court may find that a pro forma session is a standard session if the 
Senate has the mere ability to conduct business during such sessions.443 
Using the first approach, the dispositive question in the Cordray dispute 
will be whether a three-day recess is of sufficient duration to trigger the 
President’s authority under the RAC.444  It is unclear how a court would 
rule on this, given the general hesitancy to declare a bright line rule for 
recess duration445 and “limited judicial authority.”446  The OLC, in January, 
noted the difficulty in “predict[ing] with certainty how courts will react to 
challenges of appointments made during intrasession recesses, particularly 
short ones.”447 
Viewing all pro forma sessions as standard sessions might raise 
constitutional concerns related to the separation of powers doctrine.448  
Using this approach, the Senate can remain continually in pro forma session 
and completely strip the President of his constitutional RAC authority.449  
Although the President has broad discretion to determine when the Senate is 
in recess for purposes of the RAC,450 it is possible for the Senate to deprive 
the President of RAC power by staying in a continuous session, ready to 
conduct business.451  However, attempting to do so using pro forma 
sessions might effectively amount something similar to a legislative veto,452 
in which one chamber alone prevents the execution of duly enacted law.453  
Such maneuvers could unconstitutionally circumvent bicameralism and 
presentment.454  In this case, the Senate minority refused to act—not 
because of the nominee’s qualifications—but because it disagreed with an 
enacted law that could not come to life without a director.455  Thus, it has 
been argued that “the Republican minority . . . [is] achieving through 
 
 443. Id. 
 444. Id.; see, e.g., CHU, supra note 66, at 21–22. 
 445. 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25, at 9 n.13. 
 446. Id. at 8. 
 447. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 448. See, e.g., CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 34, at 23; see also CHU, supra note 66, at 
21–22. 
 449. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 34, at 23. 
 450. See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text. 
 451. 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25, at 1. 
 452. See Platt, supra note 95, at 286. 
 453. See, e.g., supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text. 
 454. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956–58 (1983) (holding that legislative acts must 
conform to bicameralism and presentment to “maintain the separation of powers, [and ensure 
that] the carefully defined limits on the power of each Branch . . . not be eroded”); see supra 
note 106 and accompanying text. 
 455. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
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obstruction what it could not through the constitutionally required 
procedures of bicameralism and presentment.”456 
As the second approach examines the individual pro forma sessions at 
issue to determine whether the Senate actually conducted business, the 
court may have to define “business,” and determine whether the Senate’s 
activity met the court’s standard.457  Because it appears that no business 
was conducted during any of the pro forma sessions beginning on January 
3, 2012, through January 23, 2012,458 it seems unlikely that these pro forma 
sessions would be considered regular sessions under this approach.459  
Thus, by this standard, a court may conclude that the Cordray appointment 
occurred during a twenty-day intrasession recess, “consistent with 
established historical precedent.”460 
Under the third approach, a pro forma session would be considered a 
standard session if the Senate has the mere ability to conduct business.  
Despite agreements to conduct no business during pro forma sessions, the 
Senate did, in fact, conduct business on two such occasions in 2011.461  On 
both occasions the Senate approved legislation by unanimous consent—the 
same agreement mechanism that has been used to approve some 
appointments in the past.462  Thus, a court may conclude that these sessions 
ought to be recognized as standard sessions and that the Cordray 
appointment simply occurred during a recess of three days.463 
4.  No Bright Line Cut-Off Exists for Recess Duration Before 
a Recess Appointment Is Permissible 
If pro forma sessions are found to sufficiently interrupt a recess for RAC 
purposes, then the inquiry must turn to whether the time in between pro 
forma sessions is of sufficient duration to make a recess appointment.464  
The Constitution’s silence on the issue of how long a recess must be before 
 
 456. Platt, supra note 95, at 286; see also Puzzanghera, supra note 14 (reporting that 
Democrats and the White House have accused Republicans of “misusing the nominations 
process to fight a legislative battle they lost”). 
 457. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 34, at 23; see, e.g., CHU, supra note 66, at 21–22. 
 458. NLRB Brief, supra note 110, at 23–24; see supra text accompanying note 389. 
 459. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 34, at 17–18.  Recall that the OLC was asked to 
analyze the permissibility of recess appointments between January 3, 2012, and January 23, 
2012.  As discussed above, a certain amount of business was, in fact, conducted between 
December 17, 2011, and January 3, 2012. See infra note 461 and accompanying text.  If the 
OLC was asked whether recess appointments were permissible during the period between 
December 17, 2011, and January 23, 2012, perhaps the Opinion would be different. 
 460. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 34, at 18; 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25, at 4. 
 461. See, e.g., CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 34, at 18; McConnell Brief, supra note 341, 
at 25–26. 
 462. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 34, at 18. 
 463. Id. at 18. 
 464. This is in line with the 2012 OLC Opinion’s two-part approach to the same issue, 
which asked whether the recess was of sufficient length to act under the RAC and whether 
pro forma sessions sufficiently interrupt a recess for RAC purposes. See supra notes 270–73 
and accompanying text. 
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the RAC is triggered helps lead to the unsettled status of this issue.465  
However, recent positions taken by the DOJ, including its position in 
Evans, suggests that there may be a cutoff of more than three days.466  In an 
attempt to answer this question, the DOJ linked the Adjournment Clause 
and the RAC,467 stating that, as both chambers are restricted from 
unilaterally recessing for more than three days, then “[i]t might be argued 
that the Framers did not consider one, two and three day recesses to be 
constitutionally significant.”468  The government reiterated this position to 
the Supreme Court as recently as 2008, when Solicitor General Neal Katyal 
stated that in order to trigger RAC action, “our office has opined that the 
recess has to be longer than three days.”469  Most recently, some, including 
the DOJ—and even the Evans Court470—shied away from making such 
cutoffs,471 and the question remains, how long must a recess be before 
recess appointments are allowed?  Although it has been argued that the 
DOJ’s functionalist interpretation might lead to appointments during a 
Senate recess of any duration,472 this argument has been squarely rejected 
by the DOJ473 and affirmed by the judiciary.474 
In the past, and in recent practice, the DOJ has hesitated to assert recess 
appointment authority during short breaks of only several days.475  
However, in response to an argument by Senator Ted Kennedy that 
allowing intrasession recess appointments would result in “lunchtime” 
appointments,476 the DOJ referred to the possibility of the three-day de 
 
 465. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 34, at 19; HOGUE, supra note 91, at 7. 
 466. See, e.g., HOGUE, supra note 91, at 7; Evans Intervening Brief, supra note 79, at 20–
21; Grassley Letter, supra note 337, at 1. 
 467. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 34, at 20 (quoting Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment at 24–26, Mackie v. Clinton, 827 F. Supp. 56 (D.D.C. 1993) (No. 93-0032-LFO) 
[hereinafter Mackie Brief]); CHU, supra note 66, at 9, 21. 
 468. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 34, at 20 (quoting Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment at 24–26, Mackie v. Clinton, 827 F. Supp. 56 (D.D.C. 1993) (No. 93-0032-LFO)). 
 469. Packing the NLRB, supra note 370. 
 470. Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1225 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Constitution . . . 
does not establish a minimum time” for a recess before the President can act under the 
RAC). 
 471. See, e.g., Victor Williams, House GOP Can’t Block Recess Appointments, NAT’L 
L.J. (Aug. 15, 201l), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202510852757&
House_GOP_cant_block_recess_appointments&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1; see also Platt, 
supra note 95, at 278.  Neither the 2012 OLC Opinion nor the DOJ’s brief for the NLRB in 
Canning draws a bright line demarcating the minimum recess duration for purposes of the 
RAC. See 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25, at 9 n.13. 
 472. See infra notes 476–78 and accompanying text; Packing the NLRB, supra note 370. 
 473. See Evans Intervening Brief, supra note 79, at 21–23; NLRB Brief, supra note 110, 
at 13. 
 474. See, e.g., Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 475. See, e.g., HOGUE, supra note 91, at 3; 2012 OLC Opinion, supra note 25, at 9 n.13; 
see also Daugherty Opinion, supra note 162 (“Nor do I think an adjournment for 5 or even 
10 days can be said to constitute the recess intended by the Constitution. . . .  [T]he line of 
demarcation can not be accurately drawn.”). 
 476. Kennedy Brief, supra note 173, at 28–29. 
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minimus rule,477 based on a link between the Adjournment Clause and the 
RAC, as mentioned above.478  Most recently, the DOJ has defended its 
interpretation of the RAC against allegations of unlimited recess 
appointment power—and violating the separation of powers—by 
maintaining that the constraints of the Daugherty functionalist approach and 
the threat of judicial review do, indeed, protect against “weekend” recess 
appointments.479  Further, the DOJ argues, this authority does not encroach 
on any branch’s powers as, inter alia, the recess appointees are temporary, 
and the Senate retains the ability to remain continuously in session to 
conduct business.480  In the thirty-year period beginning with the Reagan 
presidency in 1981, through December 2011, the shortest intersession 
recess appointment was made during an eleven-day recess, and the shortest 
intrasession recess appointment was made during a ten-day recess.481 
B.  Questions Outside of RAC Interpretation Still Remain 
Outside of pending litigation, questions surrounding the future of the 
CFPB, its director, and even the President remain to be answered.  The CRS 
and other sources help to shed light on ambiguities in the CFPB organic 
statute, the fate of the CFPB with an invalid director, and the affect of the 
public’s perception of the January 4, 2012 recess appointments. 
1.  Interpretation of the CFPB Organic Statute 
Even if the Cordray appointment occurred in a recess for RAC purposes, 
there appears to be an issue of whether the authority possessed by a recess 
appointed CFPB Director differs at all from a Senate-approved director.482  
The question derives from the statutory text in section 1011 of Dodd-
Frank,483 which states that the CFPB Director is to be appointed “by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate.”484  Thus, questions are raised as 
to whether someone who avoids this statutory requirement can be vested 
with the full authority concomitant with the position.485 
 
 477. “[I]t would make eminent sense, in construing any de minimis exception from 
otherwise applicable constitutional rules for ‘recess,’ to apply the three-day rule explicitly 
set forth in the Adjournment Clause.” Evans Intervening Brief, supra note 79, at 21; see also 
Packing the NLRB, supra note 370. 
 478. Evans Intervening Brief, supra note 79, at 23.  In support of the three-day rule, the 
DOJ noted the “commonsense notion that overnight, weekend, and perhaps even long-
weekend breaks do not affect the continuity of government.” Id. at 21. 
 479. See NLRB Brief, supra note 110, at 65 (arguing that under the functionalist standard 
an “evening, a weekend, or a lunch break . . . does not constitute a ‘Recess of the Senate’ 
under the [RAC]”). 
 480. Id. at 64. 
 481. HOGUE, supra note 91, at 3 (citations omitted). 
 482. See, e.g., CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 34, at 27; Comizio & Jabour, supra note 
337, at 5–6. 
 483. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5491(b)(2) (Supp. V 2011). 
 484. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 485. See, e.g., Comizio & Jabour, supra note 337, at 5–6. 
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However, this type of statutory requirement is not unique to the 
organization of the CFPB; statutes pertaining to the State Department, 
Treasury, and Article III judges, and—most significantly—the Constitution, 
have similar provisions, yet recess appointments still occur.486  A court 
reviewing the issue may wish to align itself with history—as opposed to 
delving into a Constitutional conflict487—by adopting a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute that does not raise constitutional concerns.488  
Thus, while this issue might not work against Cordray, it may be a feature 
of potential litigation.489 
Additionally, section 1066 of Dodd-Frank490 poses another opportunity 
for statutory confusion.491  In providing for interim leadership of the CFPB 
until a director can take office, the section instructs the Treasury Secretary 
to “perform the functions of the Bureau . . . until the Director of the Bureau 
is confirmed by the Senate.”492  The specific functions referred to in this 
section consist largely of the consolidated regulatory functions, or 
“transferred authorities,” that existed in other agencies prior to the existence 
of the CFPB.493  Thus, one interpretation of section 1066 is that a director 
who is not confirmed by the Senate does not have transferred authority,494 
and Cordray can exercise only the CFPB’s newly established power.  
Identical language in other statues has not caused complications or 
prevented the President from making unchallenged recess appointments in 
the past.495 
However, the deliberate language of section 1066 can raise issues of 
congressional intent and concomitant separation of powers issues—
including whether the appointment power of the President was meant to be 
constrained.496  As CRS observes, if the statute is indeed interpreted to 
mean that recess-appointed directors are not vested with the same authority 
as Senate-confirmed directors, then such an interpretation “may act to limit 
the effectiveness of presidential recess appointments by preventing the 
President from meaningfully filling an existing vacancy in the manner 
envisioned by the [RAC].”497  The OLC shares the view that “granting less 
power to a recess appointee” would “derogate from the President’s 
constitutional authority to fill up vacancies during recesses.”498  Thus, a 
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formalist court will be more likely to see a constitutional problem in 
limiting a recess-appointed director’s authority than a functionalist court.499  
For a formalist, any restriction of the Director’s power is in contravention 
of the President’s enunciated powers under the Constitution.500  This 
restraint would also run contrary to the well-established principle that a 
recess appointee is vested with all powers associated with a particular 
office.501 
On the other hand, a functionalist approach might recognize that 
reasonable congressional intrusion upon the President’s appointment 
powers are permissible,502 so long as such intrusions do not have the effect 
of “undermin[ing] the Presidents [sic] ability to exercise a core 
function.”503  A functionalist court may view a restriction of the Director’s 
authority as a restriction on the appointee himself, not a restriction on the 
President’s authority to make recess appointments,504 thus alleviating some 
of the concern over separation of powers.505 
2.  What If Cordray’s Appointment Is Invalid? 
What will happen to the disposition of actions taken by the CFPB under 
Cordray if his appointment is invalidated for any of the foregoing reasons?  
The De Facto Officer doctrine provides that actions of officers performed 
while clothed with the authority of law are valid, even if the officer’s 
appointment is subsequently found to be legally deficient.506  As CRS 
observes, the doctrine likely does not apply to challenges of recess 
appointment legitimacy because it generally applies to technical issues with 
appointments, rather than constitutional issues.507 
Recently, the Supreme Court displayed reluctance to apply the doctrine 
to allegedly improper appointments challenged on constitutional 
grounds.508  In Ryder v. United States,509 the Court held that parties 
bringing such challenges are entitled to a decision on the merits and 
“whatever relief may be appropriate.”510  Thus, given the constitutional 
issues discussed above, a court reviewing the legitimacy of Cordray’s 
appointment might be inclined to entertain the challenge and invalidate 
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certain CFPB rules or enforcement actions,511 as the D.C. Circuit did with 
respect to the NLRB in Canning.512 
However, this type of consideration by the judiciary could open the 
floodgates for a high number of constitutional challenges to every recess 
appointment—something that the courts have avoided and will be likely to 
avoid in the future.513  In an example of the Ryder holding in an earlier 
case, the Court, in Buckley v. Valeo,514 invalidated appointments challenged 
on constitutional grounds and awarded the plaintiffs declaratory and 
injunctive relief.515  However, the Buckley court refrained from invalidating 
the past actions of the body to which the appointments were made—the 
Federal Election Commission.516  A challenge against the validity of 
Cordray’s appointment will likely fall under the Ryder517 rule, but how a 
court might react to a challenge against Cordray, and the consequences of 
hearing the case on the merits, is far from certain.518 
3.  The Political Check on Recess Appointment Authority 
As an alternative to lengthy litigation riddled with uncertainty regarding 
justiciability,519 pro forma sessions, and indirect legislation aimed at 
hampering the President’s RAC authority,520 the political process may 
provide an effective check against RAC abuse.521  For example, after 
President Dwight Eisenhower made recess appointments to the Supreme 
Court, Senator Philip Hart introduced and passed a resolution expressing 
the Senate’s disapproval of such appointments.522  Since then, no Supreme 
Court Justices have been recess appointed, and the number of judicial 
appointments has generally decreased.523 
Additionally, the electoral system can be an effective check524 on the 
President’s already broad discretion to determine when the exercise of the 
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RAC is appropriate.525  If the public believes that an elected official has 
abused his authority in any way, “ultimately . . . the people will replace 
those in the political branches . . . who are guilty of abuse.”526  Further,  
Congress holds the impeachment power as another check on the executive’s 
behavior.527 
IV.  A MODIFIED FUNCTIONALIST STANDARD AND 
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This part argues that a functionalist RAC interpretation, akin to the 
DOJ’s current perspective,528 qualified by a three-day de minimus limit 
divined from the Adjournment Clause, should decide the permissibility of 
recess appointments.  While not purely functionalist and also short of a 
bright line rule, the proposed standard might be characterized as a modified 
functionalist standard.  This part goes on to justify this standard by 
addressing potential criticisms.  Under this standard, pro forma sessions of 
the kind used between January 3 and January 23, 2012, are insignificant and 
would not interrupt a recess for RAC purposes. 
A.  The Proposed Standard 
The proposed standard permits recess appointments when the Senate 
cannot definitely convene to conduct business for three or more days.  This 
comes with one exception:  in unforeseen emergency situations in which the 
Senate may be incapacitated and truly unable to advise and consent, the 
President, in staying true to the original purpose of the Clause,529 should be 
able to disregard the three-day limit and make recess appointments to 
ensure the undisturbed functioning of the government.  Utilizing the 
Daugherty functionalist approach, this standard relies on the President to 
assess whether the Senate can reasonably conduct business,530 with a three-
day rule to prevent RAC abuse during very short breaks.531 
Importantly, the proposed standard will likely lead to the conclusion that 
pro forma sessions used to prevent recess appointments are meaningless for 
RAC purposes.  For example, between January 3 and January 23, 2012, 
there was no indication that the Senate could “definitely convene” within 
three days to conduct business.532  Admittedly, it may be difficult to 
determine when the Senate can “definitely” not convene.533  But, the OLC’s 
reliance argument534—echoed in the DOJ’s Canning brief535—based on the 
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Senate’s assurances that it will not conduct business, will suffice to meet 
this standard.  For the Cordray recess, a unanimous resolution would have 
been required to reconvene the Senate,536 and no such resolution was 
agreed upon.537  If anything, the Senate declared its inability to convene 
during that time.538 
It is difficult to accept the argument that seconds-long pro forma 
sessions—in which the Senate unanimously agrees to conduct no 
business—preclude the President from using his RAC authority.539  As it 
appears the RAC was originally conceived precisely because the Senate 
could not be expected to stay perpetually in session,540 and given the 
unconstitutionality of the analogous legislative veto,541 it is hard to imagine 
that the Framers would have had such a procedural maneuver—which 
grants a faction such great power—in mind when they determined that the 
RAC was a necessary provision.542 
The proposed standard’s three-day limit is divined from the purported 
interplay between the RAC and Adjournment Clause,543 in order to create a 
lower limit for generally impermissible recess appointments.  Importantly, 
this aspect of the standard prevents appointments from being made during 
Adjournment Clause recesses or prolonged adjournments with pro forma 
sessions, when the Senate is due to reconvene and conduct business in three 
days or less.544  This encourages the President to make appointments early 
in the recess and prevents RAC action when the Senate might be recessed 
but can readily act within minutes.545  On the other hand, the heavy 
functionalist aspect of the proposed standard continues to rely on 
Daugherty’s assessment of the character of the Senate’s break as the 
primary factor in determining when recess appointments are permissible,546 
similar to the position of today’s DOJ.547 
The emergency exception to this standard’s three-day rule vests the 
President with authority to make appointments in unforeseen situations in 
which the Senate may not have recessed pursuant to the Adjournment 
Clause,548 or otherwise agreed to conduct no business.549  In this sense, the 
standard supports recess appointments any time the Senate is reasonably 
incapable of performing its advice and consent function.550  In line with 
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DOJ’s present interpretation of RAC authority,551 it should be left to the 
President’s discretion to determine when an extraordinary situation calls for 
suspending the three-day rule.  The President should evaluate the situation 
by weighing the functionalist Daugherty factors552 and make necessary 
appointments if it appears the Senate cannot convene in regular, or even 
“extraordinary” session.553 
B.  Justifying the Standard 
Unlike the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,554 it is difficult, today, to 
imagine the Senate being unavailable to perform its advice and consent 
function for months, or even weeks, at a time.555  As a prohibitive—and 
archaic—Senate calendar was arguably an impetus for drafting the RAC,556 
it might now be argued that the RAC has either lost its relevance or must be 
adapted to make sense in the modern day.557  For example, perhaps “the 
Recess” is better read as “a time when the Senate is unable to advise and 
consent for a prolonged period of time.”  Further, a purely functionalist 
interpretation of the RAC draws arguments that the door will be open for 
abuse of the privilege.558  This modified functionalist standard in no way 
expands the current role of presidential discretion in recess appointments559 
and might even restrict the degree of discretion that is available today. 
1.  Executive Discretion Is Not Expanded Under the 
Modified Functionalist Standard 
The three-day minimum stays true to—and arguably furthers—the 
hesitation by Attorney General Daugherty to allow appointments during 
recesses of only a few days.560  Given that the suggested standard maintains 
executive discretion as a prominent feature, formalists may point out that it 
leaves open the possibility for executive abuse.561  Whether a standard 
exists for how long a recess must be before recess appointments can be 
made is debated,562 however, and the standard proposed here allows 
appointments during recesses of less than three days only in unforeseen 
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circumstances that require the circumvention of senatorial advice and 
consent.  These events can be characterized as emergencies, excluding 
things like political gridlock in the Senate.563  Further, a perception of 
unbridled executive discretion to make recess appointments at any time 
should be mitigated by systemic checks already in place including the 
electoral system,564 the temporary terms of recess appointees,565 the 
Senate’s undisputed ability to remain continuously in session to conduct 
business,566 the Senate’s ability to pass a resolution expressing the body’s 
disapproval in the President’s actions,567 or even impeachment.568  
Importantly, the DOJ has asserted that day-to-day and weekend breaks do 
not threaten the continuity of government.569  Even the most functionalist 
interpretations of the RAC have stopped short of endorsing recess 
appointments during a recess of three days or less,570 although such 
appointments have occurred.571 
Additionally, the Daugherty functionalist interpretation properly cabins 
overnight or lunchtime RAC abuse.572  For a functionalist, today’s 
technology and infrastructure may make it difficult to find any time—
whether intrasession or intersession—in which the Senate could not advise 
and consent.573  Thus, regardless of the length or timing of the recess, or the 
nature of the vacancy itself, a functionalist might conclude that the 
necessity for the RAC as envisioned by the Founders has changed over 
time.574 
2.  No Intersession Versus Intrasession Distinction 
Significantly, the proposed standard disregards any difference between 
intrasession and intersession recesses.  Today, the distinction between 
intrasession and intersession recesses has lost relevance.575  If the argument 
is that recess appointments should be limited to intersession recesses 
because the Senate is less able to convene and conduct business, compared 
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to intrasession recesses,576 then it might follow that there should be some 
standard ensuring that recess appointments happen as early as possible in 
the recess.577  While no such rule exists,578 the proposed standard helps to 
alleviate any potential concerns, as mentioned above.579 
It is difficult to see a significant functional difference between making an 
appointment with, for example, five hours remaining in an intersession 
recess versus five hours remaining in an intrasession recess.  Certainly, the 
limits of the RAC have been tested in even more extreme circumstances, 
when appointments were made only thirty minutes before the Senate was 
scheduled to reconvene.580  The executive581 and judicial582 branches seem 
to view the Senate, today, as similarly capable—or incapable—of 
performing its advice and consent function whether it is in intersession or 
intrasession recess.  Further, in the recent past, the shortest periods of recess 
during which appointments were made do not significantly differ between 
intersession and intrasession recesses,583 and slow travel and 
communication are less of a concern today.584  In a practical sense, the fact 
that intrasession recesses are sometimes longer in duration than intersession 
recesses585 supports Daugherty’s proposition that the character of the break 
should be the dispositive factor in determining whether recess appointments 
are valid.586  Thus, asserting any sort of distinction between intersession 
and intrasession recesses seems to stretch the limits of logic and has no 
place in today’s modified functionalist standard.587 
3.  The “Emergency” Exception 
In light of extensive established precedent, the terms “recess” and 
“adjournment” should be used interchangeably.588  And, according to the 
proposed standard—like the DOJ’s current position—the Senate does not 
need to be in “recess,” pursuant to the Adjournment Clause for recess 
appointments to be constitutional.589  There could be reasons, other than 
recess, why the Senate might be unable to perform its advice and consent 
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function—a terrorist attack, an airline strike or some type of infrastructure 
breakdown—and such a reason should trigger the President’s authority 
under the RAC.590  This is facilitated by the emergency exception in the 
modified functionalist standard.  Importantly, the President’s discretion, 
even when given the presumption of validity,591 is not expanded with the 
emergency exception.  Presently, nothing explicitly prevents the President 
from making a recess appointment during a recess of fewer than three 
days.592  And, as discussed above, such appointments have indeed 
occurred.593  While the declaration of an emergency situation would rely on 
Presidential discretion, this great power is still subject to the systemic 
checks discussed above594 to ensure that it is used in only the most 
extraordinary circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
In January 2012, the recess appointment of Richard Cordray and three 
others reignited an old conflict over the scope of the President’s recess 
appointment power under the Constitution.595  Some aspects of recess 
appointments—whether they can occur during an intrasession recess and 
whether the vacancy has to occur during the same recess in which the 
appointment is made—are largely settled in the eyes of the executive 
branch and, to a limited extent, the judiciary,596 but still remain catalysts for 
debate.597  However, the most controversial, and novel, issue arising out of 
the January appointments is whether strategic use of pro forma sessions by 
Congress sufficiently interrupts a recess in a way that precludes the 
President from making recess appointments.598  Amid colorful arguments 
on both sides of the issue, the DOJ and the White House rely on a 
functionalist interpretation of the RAC to conclude that pro forma sessions 
do not—and, in maintaining the separation of powers, cannot—interrupt 
recesses in such a way, and therefore, the January 2012 recess appointments 
are legitimate.599  However, due to the novelty of the issue, the validity of 
the appointments is uncertain and presently being challenged in 
litigation.600 
The RAC serves an important function in ensuring the continuity of the 
government.601  This fundamental purpose is one of the few things agreed 
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upon by most since the founding.602  As time has passed, administrations 
have changed, Congress has changed, and most importantly, the 
infrastructure, needs, and priorities of the country have changed.603  While 
functionalists and formalists hold vastly divergent views of RAC 
interpretation and appropriate application,604 the specific needs of the 
country that precipitated the RAC at the founding, arguably, do not exist 
today.605  Yet, the general need for an undisrupted government remains the 
same, and the RAC continues to be a critical mechanism designed to satisfy 
that need.606  Employing a modified functionalist standard to determine 
when recess appointments are permissible does justice to both the Framer’s 
original intent and this country’s ever-evolving structural and political 
identity.607  Ultimately, however, it could be the judicial branch that settles 
the score in the recess appointment power battle between the executive and 
legislative branches.608 
 
 602. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 603. See, e.g., supra notes 88–95 and accompanying text. 
 604. See discussion supra Part I.D. 
 605. See supra notes 88–95 and accompanying text. 
 606. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 607. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 608. See supra notes 348–49 and accompanying text. 
